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                                  Executive Summary 
 
 
In an important but thus far unnoticed development, federal courts have created a 
new series of “default principles” for statutory interpretation, authorizing regulatory 
agencies, when statutes are unclear, (a) to exempt trivial risks from regulation and thus to 
develop a kind of common law of “acceptable risks,” (b) to take account of substitute 
risks created by regulation, and thus to engage in “health-health” tradeoffs, (c) to 
consider whether compliance with regulation is feasible, (d) to take costs into account, 
and (e) to engage in cost-benefit balancing, and thus to develop a kind of common law of 
cost-benefit analysis. These cost-benefit default principles are both legitimate and 
salutary, because they give rationality and sense the benefit of the doubt. At the same 
time, they leave many open questions. They do not say whether agencies are required, 
and not merely permitted, to go in the direction they indicate; they do not indicate when 
agencies might reasonably reject the principles; and they do not say what, specifically, 
will be counted as an “acceptable” risk or a sensible form of cost-benefit analysis. 
Addressing the open questions, this essay urges that the principles should ordinarily be 
taken as mandatory, not merely permissive; that agencies may reject them in certain 
identifiable circumstances; and that steps should be taken toward quantitative analysis of 
the effects of regulation, designed to discipline the relevant inquiries. An understanding 
of these points should promote understanding of emerging “second generation” debates, 
involving not whether to adopt a presumption in favor of cost-benefit balancing, but 
when the presumption is rebutted, and what, in particular, cost-benefit analysis should be 
taken to entail. 
 
 
   
“Courts should be reluctant to apply the literal terms of a statute to mandate 
pointless expenditures of effort…Unless Congress has been extraordinarily rigid, there is 
likely a basis for an implication of de minimis authority to provide exemption when the 
burdens of regulation yield a gain of trivial or no value.”
1 
 
“It seems bizarre that a statute intended to improve human health would…lock the 
agency into looking at only one half of a substance’s health effects in determining the 
maximum level of that substance.”
2 
 
“It is only where there is ‘clear congressional intent to preclude consideration of 
cost’ that we find agencies barred from considering costs.”
3 
 
                                                 
1 Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360-61 (DC Cir 1979). 
2 American Trucking Association v. EPA, 173 F.3d 1027, 1052 (DC Cir 1999). 
3 Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678 (DC Cir 2000). 1 
 
  Cost-Benefit Default Principles 
 
Cass R. Sunstein  
 
 
I.    Introduction 
 
Risks never exist in isolation. They are part of systems. For that reason, any effort 
to reduce a single risk will have a range of consequences, some of them likely 
unintended.  
If the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) increases security at airports, so as 
to make flying safer, it will also make flying less convenient and  more expensive, and 
thus lead some people to drive instead.
4 Flying is much safer than driving, and hence the 
FAA’s measures may increase the number of lives lost on balance. If noise levels are 
reduced at the Grand Canyon, so that people can enjoy the area in peace and quiet, air 
tourism there will have to be dramatically reduced, so that fewer people can enjoy the 
area at all.
5 If the Occupational Safety and Health Administration increases regulation of 
benzene, a carcinogenic substance, it might lead companies to use an unsafe and perhaps 
a less safe substitute; it might also decrease wages of affected workers, and decrease the 
number of jobs in the relevant industry. People who have less money, and who are 
unemployed, tend to live shorter lives––and hence occupational regulation might, under 
certain circumstances, sacrifice more lives than it saves.
6 Of course the unintended 
consequences of risk regulation might be desirable rather than undesirable––as, for 
example, where regulation spurs new pollution control technologies. 
 
Now consider the following cases: 
1.  The Clean Air Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to 
issue standards controlling any substance that “contributes significantly” to   
pollution problems in certain areas. EPA issues r egulations governing           
relevant pollutants, but without considering the costs of compliance. 
Industries challenge the regulations on the ground that cost is a statutorily              
                                                 
4 See Robert W. Hahn, The Economics of Airline Safety, 20 Harv. L. & Pub. Policy 791 (1997). 
5 Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455 (DC Cir 1998). 
6 See Symposium, Risk-Risk Analysis, 8 J Risk and Uncertainty 5 (1994); John Graham and Jonathan 
Wiener, Risk vs. Risk (1995). 2 
 
        relevant factor.
7 
2.  The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is asked to 
promote fuel economy in automobiles “to the extent feasible.” NHTSA issues 
fuel economy standards that are admittedly feasible, in the sense that no one 
doubts that they are technologically and economically possible. But the 
Coalition for Automobile Safety, a public interest organization, contends that 
the effect of the standards will be to lead manufacturers to produce smaller 
and more dangerous cars. The Coalition contends that NHTSA acted 
unlawfully in failing to take this effect into account.
8 
3.  A federal statute requires the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
to regulate toxic substances “to the extent feasible.”
9 OSHA interprets this 
language to require it to consider whether the regulation is technologically 
feasible and whether it is “practicable,” economically speaking, for the 
industry to comply. OSHA imposes a regulation that is admittedly “feasible” 
under this test; but the statute cannot pass a cost-benefit test, because the 
benefits are low and the costs a re high. Insisting that costs should be 




  In which of these cases has the agency acted unlawfully? The question is of 
immense importance, both for regulatory policy and for the relationship between courts 
and agencies. One of my main purposes here is to demonstrate that federal law has built a 
novel set of rules for statutory construction: the  cost-benefit default principles. In brief, 
these principles (1) allow de minimis exceptions to regulatory requirements; (2) authorize 
agencies to permit “acceptable” risks, departing from a requirement of “absolute” safety; 
(3) permit agencies to take account of both costs and feasibility; and (4) allow agencies to  
 
                                                 
7 Cf. Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678 (DC Cir 2000) (finding cost a permissible factor for the agency 
to consider under a similar statute; Lead Industries v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (DC Cir 1980) (finding cost an 
irrelevant factor under provisions governing national ambient air quality standards). 
8 See Competitive Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA, 956 F.2d 321 (DC Cir. 1992). 
9 29 USC 655(b)(5). 
10 ATMI v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).  3 
 
   
balance costs against benefits. Taken as a whole, the cost-benefit default principles are 
making a substantial difference to regulatory policy, both because of their effects in 
litigated cases and because of their systemic consequences for regulation.
11  
Even when thus specified, however, the default principles raise many questions. 
For the most part, the cost-benefit default principles say what agencies are  permitted to 
do. It is not clear whether the default principles also mean that where statutes are 
ambiguous, agencies will be required to do any of these things. Nor do the principles give 
much indication of how agencies permitting “acceptable” risks, or engaging in cost-
benefit analysis, might be expected to proceed. What does it mean to say that agencies 
are permitted to “consider” costs? Would it be unlawful for an agency to say that even 
very high costs are worth incurring? In what way should the monetary valuation of 
human life be constrained? What counts as an acceptable or de minimis risk? How should 
agencies deal with future generations?  
  However these questions are resolved, there can be no doubt that the cost-benefit 
default principles have emerged as a central part of what amounts to the federal common 
law of regulatory policy. Of course most of that common law, including the incipient 
federal common law of cost-benefit analysis, will emerge, and is emerging, from 
regulatory agencies, which have to decide how much to regulate, and why.
12 Here 
 
                                                 
11 See Robert Percival et al., Environmental Regulation 425 (4
th ed 2000). Related questions are currently 
before the Supreme Court in American Trucking Association v. EPA, 173 F.3d 1027 (DC Cir 1999), cert. 
granted, S Ct (2000). At issue there is the question whether costs are relevant to the setting of national 
ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act. That question is discussed below, see TAN infra. 
But the Supreme Court’s ruling is most unlikely to bear on the general claims here. If the Court rules that 
costs are irrelevant, as I believe that it should, this will be because of the clarity of the statutory language 
and the unusual structure of the Act, see below; a default rule should not override clear language, certainly 
not if the statutory structure allows costs to be considered at multiple stages. Thus a conclusion that the 
EPA need not consider costs in setting national standards would not be a defeat for the cost-benefit default 
principles; it would merely be an acknowledgement that Congress can override those principles if it 
chooses. If the Court rules, as I believe that it should not, that costs are relevant, this will be an extremely 
emphatic victory for the cost-benefit default principles. 
12 Hence, for example, different agencies have come up with different dollar figures by which to value 
statistical lives; this is a central part of agency-made common law of cost-benefit analysis. See the table in 
Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 
J. Legal Stud. 1105, 1146 (2000). There are also striking variations in agency selection of discount rate, 
that is, the treatment of costs and benefits (such as lives saved) in the future. See Comment, Judicial 
Review of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 65 U Chi L Rev 1333, 1364-69 
(1998) (documenting variations ranging from 2% to 10%). These issues are treated below. 4 
 
   
agencies are the principal architects of what is unmistakably a  form of common law. But 
courts will undoubtedly play an important role,
13 and it is in the interaction between 
agencies and judges that binding law will emerge. Among my largest purposes here is to 
understand the nature of the cost-benefit default principles, their legitimacy, and their 
future content.
14   
There is a still more general point in the background. The steady emergence of the 
cost-benefit default principles signals the impending conclusion, in all branches of 
government,
15 of a “first generation”  debate over whether cost-benefit analysis is 
desirable.
16 That debate appears to be terminating with a general victory for its 
proponents, in the form of a presumption in favor of their view (signaled above all, 
perhaps, by President Clinton’s substantial e ndorsement of cost-benefit balancing via 
Executive Order
17). The “second generation” debates raise difficult questions about how 
(not whether) to engage in cost-benefit analysis––how to value life and health, how to 
deal with the interests of future generations, how to generate rules of thumb to simplify 
complex inquiries, how to ensure that agencies do what they are supposed to do, how and 
when to diverge from the conclusion recommended by cost-benefit analysis, how to 
determine the roles of agencies and courts in contested cases. My identification and 
assessment of the cost-benefit default principles is intended as a contribution to these 
“second generation” debates. An especially important “second generation” debate raises  
 
 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5
th Cir. 1991) (striking down agency 
regulation of asbestos under statute calling for cost-benefit balancing).  
14 It is important to see that many federal agencies do not comply with the apparent requirements of cost-
benefit balancing in existing executive orders. Robert Hahn has shown that compliance is episodic and that 
a great deal needs to be done to systematize the process. See Robert W. Hahn et al., Empirical Analysis: 
Assessing Regulatory Impact Analysis: The Failure of Agencies To Comply With Executive Order 12866, 
23 Harv J. L & PP 859 (2000). Here as elsewhere, there is a large difference between law on the books and 
law in the world. I do not attempt here to address the important issue of how to ensure compliance with 
principles that call for attention to costs and benefits. But judicial review of agency action can serve as a 
partial corrective at least, ensuring that in the egregious cases, agency action will be held invalid for failure 
to comply with the principles. This point is discussed at several places below. 
15 Within Congress, see eg, 5 USC 1532, 1535; within the executive, see note supra. 
16 For discussion, see Symposium, 29 J. Legal Stud. 837 (2000); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of 
Mythic Proportions, 106 Yale LJ 1981 (1998).  
17 See Executive Order 12866, 58 Fed Reg 51735 (1993). 5 
 
   
the question when, if ever, t he presumption in favor of cost-benefit balancing is rebutted, 
and I attempt to make a start in answering that complex question. 
         The Article is organized as follows. Part II traces the rise of cost-benefit default 
rules in federal law; it begins w ith the emergence of cost-benefit principles, outlines 
statutory formulations, and then elaborates the default rules. Part III explores the 
underlying considerations in some detail––what supports the use of default principles 
generally and these default principles in particular. In Part III, I address the general 
question when the presumption in favor of the principles might be rebutted. Part IV turns 
to the question whether agencies should be required to do what the cost-benefit default 
principles permit them to do. Part V deals briefly with a set of issues that an agency must 
address if it is going to engage in cost-benefit balancing. Part VI is a brief conclusion. 
 
II.   Considering and Not Considering Costs  
A.  From 1970s Environmentalism to the Cost-Benefit State? A Prefatory Note 
I will not attempt to resolve the broad question whether cost-benefit analysis is a 
good idea, or whether the many recent initiatives in that direction should be approved or 
modified.
18 But as background to an understanding of the cost-benefit default principles, 
a brief discussion is in order. 
The rise of interest in cost-benefit balancing signals a dramatic shift from the 
initial stages of national risk regulation. Those stages were undergirded by might be 
called “1970s environmentalism,” which placed a high premium on immediate responses 
to long-neglected problems, which emphasized the existence of problems rather than their 
magnitude, and which was often rooted in moral indignation directed at the behavior of 
those who created pollution and other risks to safety and health.
19 Defining aspects of 
1970s environmentalism can be found in the apparently cost-blind national ambient air 
 
 
                                                 
18 For a range of perspectives, see Symposium, 29 J. Legal Stud. 837 (2000). 
19 See Bruce Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 13 Colum. J. Env. L. 171 
(1988). 6 
 
   
quality provisions of the Clean Air Act
20 and in statutory provisions requiring “the best 
available technology” without an assessment of either costs or benefits.
21   
No one should deny that 1970s environmentalism has done an enormous amount 
of good, helping to produce dramatic improvements in many domains, above all in the 
context of air pollution, where ambient air quality has improved for all major pollutants.
22 
Indeed, 1970s environmentalism appears, by most accounts, to survive cost-benefit 
balancing, producing aggregate benefits in the trillions of dollars, well in excess of the 
aggregate costs.
23 EPA’s own  estimates suggest that as a result of the Clean Air Act, 
there were 184,000 fewer premature deaths among people thirty years of age or older in 
1990––and also that there were 39,000 fewer cases of congestive heart failure, 89,000 
fewer cases of hospital admissions for respiratory problems, 674,000 fewer cases of 
chronic bronchitis, and 850,000 fewer asthma attacks.
24 EPA finds annual costs of air 
pollution control at $32 billion, hardly a trivial number, but less than 4% of the annual 
benefits of $1.1 trillion.
25 Even if the EPA’s own numbers show an implausibly high 
ratio, significant adjustments still show benefits far higher than costs.
26 
But even if the general picture is no cause for alarm, a closer look at federal 
regulatory policy shows a range of problems. Perhaps foremost is exceptionally poor 
priority setting, with substantial resources sometimes going to small problems, and with 
little attention to some serious problems.
27 There are also unnecessarily high costs, with 
no less than $400 billion being attributable to compliance costs each year,
28 including 
$130 billion on environmental protection alone.
29 According to one study, better  
 
                                                 
20 42 USC 7409(b). 
21 See, eg, 33 USC 1311(b)(1)AA), 42 USC 7411(a)(1), 7412(d)(2), 7475(a)(4), 7502(c)(1). 
22 See Economic Analyses at EPA 455-56 (Richard Morgenstern ed. 1998); Paul Portney, Air Pollution 
Policy, in Public Policies for Environmental Protection 77, 101-105 (Paul Portney and Robert Stavins eds 
2000). 
23 Id. 
24 Portnoy, supra, at 102-03. 
25 Id. at 109. 
26 Id. at 113 (showing a benefit-cost ratio of 3 to 1). 
27 This is the theme of Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle (1995). 
28 Thomas Hopkins, The Costs of Federal Regulation, 2 J Reg and Soc. Costs 5, 25 tbl. 2 (1992). 
29 Paul Portney and Robert Stavins, Regulatory Review of Environmental Policy, 8 J Risk and Uncertainty 
111, 119 n. 1 (1995). 7 
 
   
allocations of health expenditures could save, each year, 60,000 additional lives at no 
additional cost––and such allocations could maintain the current level of lives saved with 
$31 billion in annual savings.
30 The point has been dramatized by repeated 
demonstrations that some regulations create significant substitute risks
31––and that with 
cheaper, more effective tools, regulation could achieve its basic goals while saving 
billions of dollars.
32 
In these circumstances, the movement for cost-benefit analysis has been rooted 
not in especially controversial judgments about what government ought to be doing, but 
instead in a more mundane search for pragmatic instruments designed to reduce the 
problems of poor priority-setting, excessively costly tools, and inattention to unfortunate 
side-effects of regulation. By drawing attention to costs and benefits, it should be 
possible to spur the most obviously desirable regulations, to deter the most obviously 
undesirable ones, to encourage a broader view of consequences, and to promote a search 
for least-cost methods of achieving regulatory goals.
33 On these counts, the record of 
cost-benefit analysis, at least within EPA, is generally encouraging.
34 Assessments of 
costs and benefits has, for example, helped produce more stringent and rapid regulation 
of lead in gasoline; promoted more stringent regulation of lead in drinking water; led to 
stronger controls on air pollution at the Grand Canyon and the Navaho Generating 
Station; and produced a reformulated gasoline rule that promotes stronger controls on air 
pollutants.
35 In these areas, cost-benefit analysis, far from being an obstacle to regulation, 
has spurred governmental attention to serious problems.  
Cost-benefit analysis has also led to regulations that accomplish statutory goals at 
lower cost, or that do not devote limited private and public resources to areas where they 
are unlikely to do much good. With respect to asbestos, for example, an analysis of  
 
                                                 
30 Tammy Tengs et al., Five Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Cost-Effectiveness, 15 Risk 
Analysis 369 (1995). 
31 See John Graham and Jonathan Wiener, Risk vs. Risk (1995). 
32 See, e.g., A. Denny Ellerman et al., Markets in Clean Air (2000); Robert Stavins, Market-Based 
Environmental Policies, in Public Policies for Environmental Protection, supra, at 31, 35-55. 
33 For many examples, see Economic Analysis at EPA (Richard Morgenstern ed. 1996). 
34 See id. 
35 See id. at 458. 8 
 
   
benefits and costs led the EPA to tie the phase-down schedules to the costs of substitutes, 
and also to exempt certain products from a flat ban.
36 With respect to lead in gasoline and 
control of CFCs (destructive of the ozone layer), cost-benefit analysis helped spur the use 
of economic incentives rather than command-and-control regulation
37; economic 
incentives are much cheaper and make more stringent regulation possible in the first 
place. For regulation of sludge, protection of farmworkers, water pollution regulation for 
the Great Lakes, and controls on organic chemicals, cost-benefit analysis helped 
regulators produce modifications that significantly reduced costs.
38 One of the most 
serious problems appears to be, not agency use of cost-benefit analysis, but frequent 
noncompliance with executive branch requirements that agencies engage in such 
analysis.
39 
Of course cost-benefit analysis is hardly uncontroversial.
40 Insofar as both costs 
and benefits are measured by the economic criterion of “private willingness to pay,” there 
are many issues. Poor people often have little ability and hence little willingness to pay; 
some people will be inadequately informed, and hence show unwillingness to p ay for 
benefits that would make their lives go better
41; and perhaps regulatory agencies should 
seek, not private willingness to pay, but public judgments, as expressed in public 
arenas.
42 Society is not best taken as some maximizing machine, in which aggregate 
output is all that matters; sometimes a regulation producing $5 million in benefits but $6 
million in costs will be worthwhile, if those who bear the costs (perhaps representing 
dollar losses alone?) can do so easily, and if those who receive the benefits (perhaps 
representing lives and illnesses averted?) are especially needy. 
In view of these problems, the strongest arguments for cost-benefit balancing are 
based, not only on neoclassical economics, but also on an understanding of human 
cognition, on democratic considerations, and on an assessment of the real-world record of  
                                                 
36 Id. at 458. 
37 Id. at 49-86; 131-169. 
38 Id. at 458. 
39 See Hahn, supra note. 
40 For a general challenge to quantification, see Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 
106 Yale LJ 1981 (1998). 
41 See Adler and Posner, supra note. 
42 Many of these points are pressed in Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (1993). 9 
 
   
such balancing.
43 Begin with cognition: People have a hard time in understanding the 
systemic consequences of one-shot interventions,
44 and unless they are asked to seek a 
full accounting, they are likely to focus on small parts of problems, producing inadequate 
or even counterproductive solutions.
45 Cost-benefit analysis is a way of producing that 
full accounting. Ordinary people also have difficulty in calculating probabilities, and they 
tend to rely on rules of thumb, or heuristics, that can lead them to make systematic 
errors.
46 Cost-benefit analysis is a natural corrective here. Because of intense emotional 
reactions to particular incidents, people often make mistakes in thinking a bout the 
seriousness of certain risks.
47 Cost-benefit balancing should help government resist 
demands for regulation that are rooted in misperceptions of facts.  
With respect to democracy, the case for cost-benefit analysis is strengthened by 
the fact that  interest-groups are often able to use these cognitive problems strategically, 
thus fending off regulation that is desirable, or pressing for regulation when the argument 
on its behalf is fragile.
48 Here cost-benefit analysis, taken as an input into decisions, can 
protect democratic processes by exposing an account of consequences to public view. A 
review of the record suggests that cost-benefit balancing leads to improvements, not on 
any controversial view of how to value the goods at stake, but simply because such 
balancing leads to more stringent regulation of serious problems, less costly ways of 
achieving regulatory goals, and a reduction in expenditures for problems that are, by any 
account, relatively minor.
49 
None of these points suggests that cost-benefit analysis is a panacea for the 
problems that I have identified. Everything depends on questions of implementation, and  
                                                 
43 I attempt to develop this point in Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. Legal 
Stud. 1059 (2000). In the same vein, see Allan Gibbard, Risk and Value, in Values At Risk 94-112 
(Douglas MacLean ed 1986). 
44 See Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure (1994). 
45 Id. 
46 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heurisics and Biases, in Judgment 
under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky eds 
1982); Roger Noll and James Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive psychology for Risk regulation, 19 J. 
Legal Stud. 747 (1990). 
47 See George Loewenstein et al., Risk As Feelings (forthcoming 2001). 
48 See Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683 
(1999). 
49 See Economic Analysis at EPA 455-76. 10 
 
   
there are also hard questions about appropriate valuation, questions to which I shall 
return. Sometimes respect for rights, or concerns about irreversibility, justify a rejection 
of cost-benefit balancing.
50 The central point is that cost-benefit analysis can be seen, not 
as opposition to some abstraction called “regulation,” and not as an endorsement of the 
economic approach to valuation, but as a pragmatic instrument, designed to ensure that 
the consequences of regulation are placed before relevant officials and the public as a 
whole, and intended to spur attention to neglected problems while at the same time 
ensuring that limited resources will be devoted to areas where they will do the most good. 
So understood, cost-benefit analysis promises to attract support from a wide range of 
people with diverse perspectives on contested issues––a promise realized in the 
apparently growing bipartisan consensus on some form of cost-benefit balancing in many 
domains of regulatory policy.
51 
B.  Statutory Terms 
The emphasis here will be on the relationship between these points and judge-
made default rules for statutory interpretation. But judge-made rules  have considerable 
overlap with approaches taken explicitly by Congress, in statutes governing health, 
safety, and the environment. In fact there is undoubtedly an interaction effect between 
statutes and judge-made law, with default principles emerging from statutory 
formulations and vice-versa. Part of the argument for the cost-benefit default principles is 
that they fit well with explicit enactments in other areas of the law. In dealing with the 
role of benefits and costs, federal statutes tend to fall in  the following categories. I order 
the statutes roughly in accordance with their treatment of cost-benefit balancing, 
beginning with those that most flatly reject it, and ending with those that unambiguously 
embrace it.   
 
1.  Flat bans on consideration of costs. Some statutes, exemplifying 1970s 
environmentalism, appear to forbid any consideration of cost. Perhaps the most 
famous example is the Delaney Clause, which for a long period prohibited food  
                                                 
50 TVA v. Hill, 437 US 153 (1978). 
51 See Executive Order 12866, 58 Fed Reg 51735 (1993). 11 
 
      additives that “induce cancer in man or animal.”
52 In the face of that language, the 
government sought to permit additives that, while carcinogenic, created only the  
most miniscule risks of cancer––lower risks, in fact than those that would come 
from eating one peanut with the FDA-permitted level of aflatoxins e very 250 
days, and much lower risks than come from spending about 17 hours every year 
in Denver (with its high elevation and radiation levels) rather than the District of 
Columbia.
53 Nonetheless, the Delaney Clause was taken to forbid any form of 
balancing.
  54 But a far more important example comes from the most fundamental 
provisions of the Clean Air Act, governing national ambient air quality 
standards.
55 For a long time, the national ambient air quality standards set under 
that Act have been understood to be based on “public health” alone.
56 The EPA’s 
judgment is to be grounded only in benefits; the cost of compliance is irrelevant.  
2.  Significant risk requirements. An alternative formulation is to require the 
agency to address only “significant” or “unacceptable” risks. On this view, risks 
that do not reach a certain level need not and perhaps may not be addressed. This 
is the prevailing interpretation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, under 
both the toxic substance provisions and the more general provisions of the Act.
57 
A requirement of a “significant risk” falls short of cost-benefit analysis in the 
sense that it is entirely  benefits-based; costs are irrelevant as such. Once benefits 
fall below a certain threshold, regulation is not required and in fact is banned.
58 
Once benefits rise above that threshold, regulation is permissible, even if the 
benefits seem low in comparison to the costs. 
                                                 
52 21 USC 376(b)(5)(B). 
53 Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (DC Cir 1987). 
54 Id. 
55 42 USC 7409(b). 
56 Lead Industries v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (DC Cir 1980). See also Union Electric Company v. EPA, 427 
US 246 (1976) (holding that EPA may not consider economic and technological feasibility when approving 
or disapproving a state implementation plan). As noted, the issue is currently before the Supreme Court. 
See note supra. 
57 Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. API, 448 US 607 (1980); International Union, UAW v. 
OSHA, 37 F.3d 605 (DC Cir 1994). 
58 American Trucking Assn. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (DC Cir 1999), appears to endorse this view for 
regulation of air pollutants, on the theory that an interpretation that would allow the EPA to pick any point 
it chooses would violate the nondelegation doctrine.  12 
 
  3.      Substitute risks and health-health tradeoffs. Some statutes require agencies 
to consider whether a regulation c ontrolling one risk would, in so doing, create a 
substitute risk. If so, agencies are permitted to decline to regulate, or to regulate to 
a different point. These are clear statutory recognition of  health-health tradeoffs, 
which arise when there are health concerns on both sides of the equation, from 
both more and less regulation.
59 The “consideration” requirements discussed in 
(4) above have an unambiguous feature of this sort, by requiring agencies to take 
account of “non-air quality health and environmental impacts.” The Toxic 
Substances Control Act similarly requires the EPA to take account of substitute 
risks.
60 
4.  Feasibility requirements. Some statutes require agencies to regulate “to the 
extent feasible” or “achievable.”
61 These expressions are far from transparent. But 
as generally understood, such statutes put the focus not on benefits but solely on 
costs, and on costs in a particular way: They forbid an agency from regulating to a 
point that is neither (a) technically feasible, because the relevant control 
technology does not exist, nor (b) economically feasible, because the industry 
cannot bear the cost without significant or massive business failures.
62 The line 
between (a) and (b), usually treated as crisp and simple, is hardly that; whether a 
requirement is technically feasible will usually depend on the level of resources 
that are devoted to it. In practice, (a) and (b) overlap in practice, with (b) serving 
as a separate category only on those occasions when even with massive use of 
existing resources, the technology cannot be brought into existence. Noteworthy 
here is the fact that while a significant risk requirement is entirely benefits-based, 
a feasibility requirements looks exclusively at the cost side of the equation. 
5.  “Consideration” requirements. A large number of statutes ask agencies to 
“take into consideration” various factors, including cost, in addition to the 
principal factor to which the statute draws the agency’s attention (such as clean 
air or water). The most common formulation, now standard, asks the agency to  
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      produce the “maximum degree of reduction” that is “achievable,” after “taking 
into consideration [1] the cost of achieving such emission reduction, and [2] any 
[a] non-air quality health and environmental impacts and [b] energy 
requirements.”
63 The basic idea here is that the agency is supposed to qualify the 
pursuit of the “maximum” achievable reduction by asking (a) whether the cost is 
excessive, (b) whether energy requirements would be adversely affected, and (c) 
whether the  “maximum” requirement might create health and environmental 
harms by, for example, increasing water pollution though reducing air pollution. 
Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, EPA is similarly instructed to back away 
from the maximum feasible level if the benefits of the stricter standard “would not 
justify the costs of complying with the level.”
64 
6.  Cost-benefit requirements. Several statutes ask agencies to balance costs 
against benefits, mostly through a prohibition on “unreasonable risks,” alongside 
a definition of “unreasonable” that refers to both costs and benefits. The most 
prominent examples are the Toxic Substances Control Act
65 and the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.
66 Here the agency is required to 
calculate both costs and benefits and to compare them against each other. If the 
costs exceed the benefits, regulation is unacceptable. More recently, cost-benefit 
analysis is mandated by the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments.
67 While 
Congress has thus far resisted efforts to impose a cost-benefit “supermandate” 
calling for a general decision rule based on cost-benefit balancing,
68 Congress has 
enacted legislation requiring assessment, and public disclosure, of costs and 
benefits of major regulations.
69  
 
In the abstract, the distinctions a mong these kinds of provisions should be clear 
enough. A statute that calls for consideration of substitute risks does not require cost- 
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benefit balancing, because it is more narrowly concerned to ensure that risks (generally to 
health) do not increase on balance; under a statute calling for health-health tradeoffs, it is 
irrelevant that costs as such exceed benefit. A statute that requires that regulations be 
“feasible” is ordinarily taken to entail no comparison between costs and benefits, but a 
cost-focused inquiry into what industry is able to do––whereas a statute that regulates 
“significant risks” is ordinarily taken to entail no comparison between costs and benefits, 
but a benefit-centered inquiry into the magnitude of the risk to be addressed. Of course 
many open questions remain, and I will return to those questions in Part IV. Let us simply 
take this menu of options as the background for understanding the nature of the cost-
benefit default rules.  
C.  The Default Rules Identified: An Overview 
If Congress has been genuinely clear, the legal issue is at an end. But statutory 
terms are frequently ambiguous (this is an initial difficulty), and sometimes an 
interpretive problem is created by general language that seems not to reflect anything like 
congressional consideration of the specific point at issue (this is a second difficulty). In 
the face of statutory uncertainty, cases provide support for each of the following 
principles. For some of the principles, the law is more developed than for others; but each 
of the principles is an identifiable part of contemporary public law. 
    -- Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be permitted to make de 
minimis exceptions to statutory requirements, by exempting small risks from 
regulatory controls.
70 
    -- Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be permitted to take costs 
into account in issuing regulations. In its current form, this principle means that 
where statutes are ambiguous, agencies will have the authority to consider costs as 
well as benefits.
71  
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  -- Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be permitted to balance    
the health risks created by regulation against the health benefits created by 
regulation.
72 
-- Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be permitted to decline to 
regulate past the point where regulation would be economically or technologically 
feasible.
73 
-- Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be expected to balance 
costs against benefits in issuing regulations.
74 
 
Now let us explore some details. 
D.  De Minimis Exceptions 
1. The basic idea. In a series of cases, the D.C. Circuit has developed a principle 
authorizing agencies to make de minimis exceptions to regulatory requirements. The 
initial case was Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy.
75 There the agency banned acrylonitrile on the 
ground that it counts a “food additive,” migrating in small amounts from bottle into 
drinks within bottles. The FDA concluded that the ban was justified on safety grounds, a 
conclusion that the court found inadequately justified. But what is more important in the 
case is the general language with which the court remanded the case to the FDA. The 
court stressed that the agency had discretion to exclude a chemical from the statutory 
definition of food additives if “the level of migration into food…is so negligible as to 
present no public health or safety concerns.”
76  
A related case presented the question whether the EPA was permitted to make 
categorical exemptions under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program of the 
Clean Air Act.
77 The court showed considerable enthusiasm for such exemptions. It 
announced that “[c]ategorical exemptions may be permissible as an exercise of agency 
power, inherent in most statutory schemes, to overlook circumstances that in context may  
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fairly be considered de minimis. It is commonplace, of course, that the law does not 
concern itself with trifling matters, and this principle has often found application in the 
administrative context. Courts should be reluctant to apply the literal terms of a statute to 
mandate pointless expenditures.”
78 In fact the court expressly connected this principle 
with the idea that the court should “look beyond the words to the purpose of the act” to 
avoid “absurd or futile results.”
79 Thus the court concluded, in its broadest statement on 
the point, that “most regulatory statutes, including the Clean Air Act, permit” de minimis 
exemptions upon an adequate factual showing.
80 Here, then, is an explicit recognition of 
agency authority to exempt de minimis risks from regulatory controls. The authority 
operates as a clear statement principle, no less but also no more: Where Congress has 
unambiguously banned such exceptions, agencies are bound, and may not create de 
minimis exemptions even in compelling circumstances.
81 
In the same vein, consider Sierra Club v. Department of Transportation.
82 At issue 
there was a statutory requirement that the Secretary of Transportation refuse to approve 
the “use” of significant public park land unless “the program or p roject includes all 
possible planning to minimize the harm to the park…resulting from the use.”
83 The 
statutory question was whether limited commercial jet landings in an airport in the Grand 
Teton National Park should qualify as a “use,” in the face of a reasonable agency finding 
that the increase in flights would not result in a “significant” change in noise. The court 
found that the term “use” should be understood to authorize de minimis exceptions.
84 
There are many decisions in the same vein.
85 
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  2.  The OSHA variation: requiring de minimis exceptions. A noteworthy variation on 
the basic idea of permitting de minimis exceptions can be found in the plurality opinion 
in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. API, known as the Benzene Case.
86 What 
the plurality s aid represents a variation on the basic idea for two reasons. First, the 
plurality  forbids the agency to regulate trivial risks; it goes well beyond permitting the 
agency to create exemptions. Second, the plurality’s substantive standard is phrased not 
in  terms of de minimis exceptions to regulation, but of limiting regulation to “significant” 
risks, and hence prohibiting regulation of risks not shown to be “significant.” The 
difference might or might not be important, because it is not clear whether risks that do 
not qualify as “significant” should be treated as de minimis, though this does appear to be 
what the plurality had in mind. 
The central issue in the case was whether OSHA had to show a “significant risk” 
in order to regulate a toxic substance (benzene in the case itself). In arguing that it did 
not, the government pointed to the central provision, which said (and says) that in 
promulgating the relevant standards, the Secretary “shall set the standard which most 
adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that 
no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity, even if such 
employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of 
his working life.”
87 The statute’s general definition of occupational safety and health 
standards said (and says) that these are standards “reasonably necessary or appropriate to 
provide safe or healthful places of employment.”
88 
A straightforward interpretation of the statutory terms, urged by four justices on 
the Supreme Court, would seem to suggest that no significant risk need be shown. The 
key statutory language is the “no employee will suffer” phrase, which indicates that even 
if a toxic substance places only one or a few workers in jeopardy, OSHA must act to 
provide protection. Whatever the meaning of the obscure general definitional clause 
(“reasonably necessary or appropriate”), the more specific provision, dealing with toxic 
substances, would appear to trump any contrary indications in the more general one. 
Nonetheless, a plurality of the Court rejected OSHA’s argument to this effect and hence  
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rejected OSHA’s interpretation of the statute. In holding that a “significant risk” must be 
shown, the plurality contended that a contrary interpretation would defy common sense: 
“In light of the fact that there are literally thousands of substances used in the workplace 
that have been identified as carcinogens or suspected carcinogens, the Government’s 
theory would give OSHA power to impose enormous costs that might produce little, if 
any, discernible benefits.”
89 Though the plurality left undecided the question whether the 
agency must also show a reasonable proportion between costs and benefits, it is clear that 
the “significant  risk” requirement was motivated partly by the desire to ensure some kind 
of proportionality between benefits and costs, on the theory that the requirement serves to 
protect against the most egregious disproportions. 
In American Textile Manufacturers’ Institute v. Donovan,
90 however, the Court 
emphasized what it saw as the ordinary meaning of the word ”feasible” in order to hold 
that OSHA was not required to engage in cost-benefit balancing. In the Court’s view, the 
agency’s job is to ensure that all regulated risks are “significant.” Once a significant risk 
is shown, the agency is to regulate to the point where compliance would no longer be 
“feasible,” in the sense of practicable.
91 The fact that a regulation violated a cost-benefit 
test is neither here nor there. This holding raises many questions, to which I will return.
92 
For the moment the key point is that the Court’s interpretation of OSHA builds on the 
idea that de minimis exceptions are permitted to reach a conclusion that insignificant 
risks may not be regulated at all. 
E. Consideration of Cost 
The presumption that agencies may “consider costs” has also emerged in a series 
of important cases within the D.C. Circuit. Consider three examples, 
At issue in Grand Canyon Air Coalition v. FAA,
93 was an FAA regulation 
designed to reduce noise from airplanes over the Grand Canyon. The statute required  
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“substantial restoration” of the “natural quiet,” which the FAA understood to require that 
the Park achieve 50% of the natural quiet at least 75% of the day. In refusing to impose 
stricter controls, the FAA explained that it took into “consideration of the needs of the air 
tour industry.”
94 From its ambiguous explanation, it appears that the FAA sought partly 
to protect the air tour industry as such, but mostly to protect tourists in their ability to see 
the Grand Canyon from the air. Not surprisingly, the FAA had been asked to impose both 
more strict and less strict regulation, and its decision was contested, by different parties, 
as both too strict and as excessively lenient. 
Those challenging the rule said that the FAA’s task was to ensure “substantial 
restoration” of the “natural quiet,” and that protection of the air tour industry was a 
statutorily irrelevant factor.
95 The court responded by invoking something like  a 
presumption in favor of considering cost, noting that nothing in the statute “forbids the 
government from considering the impact of its regulation on the air tour industry.”
96 The 
court’s passage is ambiguous, but it appears to be a recognition that in the face of 
congressional silence, at least one kind of cost––that involving the air tour industry––will 
be within agency discretion to consider. The narrowest construction of the court’s 
opinion is that statutes should not be taken to be self-defeating, so  that the FAA is 
permitted to conclude that a statute designed to enable people to enjoy the Grand Canyon, 
by reducing noise, should not be implemented with regulation so strict as to disable 
people from enjoying the Grand Canyon by the air. A broader reading is that under 
ambiguous statutes, agencies will be presumed able to take into account the costs of 
various implementation strategies.
97 
Support for the broader reading comes from George Warren Corp. v. EPA,
98 
where domestic companies challenged the EPA’s  implementation of the reformulated 
gasoline provisions of the Clean Air Act. A central question for the EPA was how to treat 
foreign refiners and importers. In resolving that question, the EPA considered not only air 
quality benefits, but also the comments of the Department of Energy (DOE). That agency  
                                                 
94 Id. at 48. 
95 Id. at 49. 
96 Id. 
97 This is how the case is read in Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.2d 663, (2000). 20 
 
   
expressed concern that certain approaches could increase the price and decrease the 
quantity of gasoline, by making it more difficult for foreign refiners to divert production 
to the United States in periods of increased demand.
99 The EPA took this point expressly 
into account in its rule. The result was an outcome more favorable to foreign refiners, and 
less favorable to environmental protection or domestic competitors, than EPA might 
otherwise have chosen.  Nonetheless, the court upheld the agency’s decision, emphasizing 
the absence of an explicit legislative ban on consideration of these economic factors.
100  
The court appeared to suggest that an express congressional preclusion of economic 
factors would be necessary in order to make them irrelevant as a matter of law. 
By far the most explicit statement on point, however, comes from State of 
Michigan v. EPA.
101 At issue there was an EPA decision to approve a state 
implementation plan (SIP) for the regulation of o zone. The statutory term provided that 
SIPs must contain provisions adequately prohibiting “any source or other type of 
emissions activity within the state from emitting any air pollutants in amounts which 
will...contribute significantly to nonattainment i n, or interfere with maintenance by, any 
other State with respect to any such national primary or secondary ambient air quality 
standard.”
102 At first glance, this provision might well be read as a kind of absolute ban 
on “significantly contributing” pollutants. But the EPA did not understand it that way. 
Instead the EPA reached a more subtle conclusion: The “significant contributors” would 
be required to reduce their ozone, but only by the amount achievable via “highly cost-
effective controls,”
103 meaning those that could produce large reductions relatively 
cheaply. In states with high control costs, then, relatively low reductions would be 
required.  
Apparently because of the clarity of the statutory language on the particular point, 
no one in the case argued that EPA was required to balance costs against benefits before 
issuing regulations. Challenging the EPA’s interpretation, environmental groups urged  
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that the statute banned any consideration of costs at all. The court rejected the argument, 
finding no “clear congressional intent to preclude consideration of costs.”
104 But the court 
obviously had a difficult time with the statutory terms “contribute significantly,” which 
seem to refer to environmental damage, not to environmental damage measured in light 
of  cost. In upholding the EPA’s decision, the court insisted that significance should not 
“be measured in only one dimension,” that of “health alone.” In fact in some settings, the 
term “begs a consideration of costs.”
105 In the court’s view, EPA would be unable to 
determine “’significance’ if it may consider only health,” especially in light of the fact  
that ozone causes adverse health effects at any level. If adverse effects exist on all levels, 
how can EPA possibly choose a standard without giving some weight to cost?
106 
But there is a serious problem for this conclusion. Taken together, the OSHA 
cases seem to argue in the opposite direction. As we have seen, the requirement that 
OSHA show a “significant” risk (a requirement imposed in the Benzene Case) has not 
been taken to mean that OSHA must or even may consider costs (with cost-benefit 
balancing apparently banned by the Cotton Dust Case). To this the court responded that 
in the aftermath of those cases, OSHA has itself attempted to ensure, and invariably 
claimed, that the costs of safety standards are “reasonably related to their benefits.”
107 In 
any case “the most formidable obstacle” to a ban on consideration of cost “is the settled 
law of this circuit,”
108 which requires an explicit legislative statement to preclude 
consideration of cost. Here, then, is an express judicial endorsement of a cost-benefit 
default principle, permitting agencies to consider costs if they seek to do so. 
F. Substitute Risks 
Extensive attention has recently been given to the problem of “risk-risk” or 
“health-health” tradeoffs, which arise when regulation of one health problem gives rise to  
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another health problem.
109 Suppose that more stringent fuel economy standards for new 
cars, justified partly on environmental and thus health-related grounds, would have the 
effect of leading automobile manufacturers to produce smaller and more dangerous cars, 
thus resulting in a significant loss of life in accidents.
110 Is the agency entitled to take this 
effect into account? Or suppose that the FDA is asked to require genetically engineered 
foods to be labeled as such; if the labels would lead consumers to switch to less safe 
substitutes, such as organic foods,
111 may the FDA take that effect into account? Or 
return to the case with which I began and suppose that the Federal Aviation 
Administration is asked to require children under the age of three to have their own seats 
in airplanes. The regulation might be urged on the ground that it would prevent a number 
of injuries in the air and also produce protection in the event of a crash. In the abstract, it 
is reasonable to think that children will be helped as a result. But suppose that a 
consequence of the mandatory purchase of a seat would be to lead many parents to drive 
rather than fly, on the ground that flying has suddenly become significantly more 
expensive. It is possible that the overall consequence of the proposed FAA rule would be 
that more children will die. Is the FAA permitted to take this effect into account?  
Recent cases suggest an emerging p rinciple of interpretation, in the form of a 
strong presumption in favor of permitting agencies to take account of substitute risks, and 
hence to undertake health-health tradeoffs. In  American Trucking Association, for 
example, it was argued that while ground-level ozone creates certain health risks, it also 
produces certain health benefits, above all because it provides protection against skin 
cancer and cataracts.
112 The EPA responded that it lacked authority to consider the risks 
created by regulation or ( to put the point slightly differently) the health benefits of an air 
pollutant.
113  
Taken on its own, the statutory text seemed to support the EPA’s view, or at least 
to make that view a reasonable interpretation of ambiguous terms. The statute provides  
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that ambient standards must be based on “criteria” documents, which are supposed to 
include “the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of all 
identifiable effects on public health or welfare which may be expected from the presence 
of such pollutant in the ambient air, in varying quantities.”
114 EPA urged, plausibly, that 
the phrase “identifiable effects” of “such pollutant” was meant to refer to the adverse 
effects of the “pollutant,” not to its beneficial effects. But the court c oncluded that the 
statute could not be interpreted in that way.
115 In a passage that suggests a strong 
presumption in favor of health-health tradeoffs, the court said (unconvincingly) that the 
statute was unambiguous, and (more convincingly) that “EPA’s interpretation fails even 
the reasonableness standard...; it seems bizarre that a statute intended to improve human 
health would...lock the agency into looking at only one half of a substance’s health 
effects in determining the maximum level for that substance.”
116 What is most striking 
about this suggestion is that the court seems to have gone beyond the view that the 
agency is permitted to engage in health-health tradeoffs if it chooses, and to require the 
EPA to do so even if it would chose otherwise. 
Or consider Competitive Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA,
117 where the plaintiffs 
challenged fuel economy standards precisely on the ground that the agency had failed to 
take account of the adverse effects of such standards on automobile safety. In the face of 
an ambiguous statute, the court insisted that a full explanation was required for a decision 
that, in the abstract, would create serious substitute risks.
118 As a result of this decision, it 
is now the law that NHTSA must taken into account any evidence of adverse s afety 
effects in the process of setting fuel economy standards. On remand, NHTSA confronted 
the evidence and concluded that the alleged effect could not be demonstrated––a 
conclusion that the court upheld on appeal.
119 What is important for present purposes is 
the clear holding that the agency is permitted and even obliged to consider health-health 
tradeoffs in setting fuel economy standards. 
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  G.  Feasibility 
Many statutes expressly require regulation to be “feasible.”
120 But what if the 
statute is silent or ambiguous on the question whether agencies may impose regulations 
beyond the point of “feasibility”? Sometimes statutes are “technology-forcing,” in the 
sense that they require companies to innovate, and thus to go well beyond what current 
technology permits.
121 Often, however, technology-forcing is entirely feasible, indeed 
that it part of the reason that Congress requires it. In fact technology-forcing can be 
justified by cost-benefit principles themselves––if the benefits of forcing technology 
outweigh the costs, as they sometimes do. But because of sheer cost, regulation will 
sometimes raise serious questions from the standpoint of feasibility, in the sense that it 
will drive many companies out of business or require technologies that are not now and 
cannot soon be made available. Here the question is how to handle legislative silence. 
The question arose most prominently in NRDC v. EPA,
122 involving the toxic 
substances provision of the Clean Air Act. That provision, since substantially revised, 
required EPA to issue regulations that would provide “an ample margin of safety to 
protect the public health.”
123 The principal question was whether cost was relevant to the 
EPA’s judgment. On its face, the statute might seem to block any consideration of cost 
and indeed to require regulations that would reduce risks to zero, especially because for 
many toxic substances, safe thresholds simply do not exist. Alert to this point, the EPA 
urged that it should be allowed to take feasibility into account in setting regulations. The 
court accepted this conclusion by suggesting that regulations could avoid “zero risk” in 
two ways. First, the EPA was required to make an initial, benefits-based, cost-blind 
determination of what is “safe”; but citing the Benzene case, the court said that “safe” did 
not mean “risk-free.”
124 Thus “the Administrator’s decision must be based upon an expert 
judgment with regard to the level of emission that will result in an ‘acceptable’ risk to 
health.”
125 Of course there is a degree of arbitrariness in any particular judgment here,  
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especially if the judgment is cost-blind. But the court was apparently attempting to ensure 
a degree of visibility and consistency in agency decisions, by ensuring that the 
“acceptable risk” judgment would be made publicly, and would be adhered to in a range 
of cases. Second, the court said that in deciding how far to go beyond “safety,” in order to 
provide an “ample margin,” the Administrator was permitted to consider both costs and 
feasibility.
126 It is clear that the court engrafted these ideas onto a statute that did not 
expressly include them. In this sense, the decision suggests an interpretive principle to the 
effect that a statute that is silent or ambiguous on the point will ordinarily be taken to 
permit the agency to take account of the feasibility of statutory commands. 
H. Costs and Benefits 
If the statute is ambiguous or silent on the point, will an agency be permitted to 
decide in accordance with cost-benefit balancing? Is an agency authorized to make such 
balancing the basis for decision?  
1. In general. An affirmative answer was given in NRDC v. EPA.
127 At issue there 
was the EPA’s decision whether to classify a source of fugitive emissions as “major” 
within the meaning of a statutory provision calling for regulation of “major e mitting 
facilities.
128 The EPA concluded that it would not add certain industrial sources, 
including surface coal mines, on the ground that the social and economic costs of 
regulation would outweigh the environmental benefits.
129 The statutory language did not 
require cost-benefit analysis and the court emphasized that an alternative construction as 
not barred by statutory language and legislative history.
130 Nonetheless, the court said 
that it would treat the agency’s interpretation as permissible in the face of legislative 
silence. 
Interpretation of OSHA has showed identical thinking. Outside of the area of 
toxic substances, the statute (with its opaque “reasonably necessary or appropriate” 
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language) is ambiguous on whether cost-benefit analysis may be made the basis for 
decision. Here courts have gone out of their way to say that OSHA is permitted to decide 
on the basis of cost-benefit balancing if it wishes.
131 In a challenge to the agency’s 
lockout/tagout rule, the court of appeals said that such balancing would be a permissible 
basis for agency decisions, and indeed seemed to suggest that this would be the court’s 
preferred route.
132 On remand, the agency appeared to decline the court’s invitation, 
choosing a test based largely on a mixture of the “significant r isk” and “feasibility” 
requirements, a test that the court upheld.
133 But the story does not end there. The agency 
has continued to say––perhaps to insulate itself from a court challenge––that it finds a 
“reasonable relationship” between costs and benefits,  and in its most recent 
pronouncement on the issue, the court treats this as an authoritative constructive of the 
statute.
134 It remains to see whether an OSHA regulation that is said not to show such a 
reasonable relationship might be challenged as unlawful. 
2.  The TSCA wrinkle. A more aggressive ruling, with a statutory text more 
favorable to cost-benefit balancing, is Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA.
135 What makes 
this a wrinkle is that as in the Benzene case, the court said not merely that the agency is 
permitted to follow an interpretive principle, but that it is required to do so. At the same 
time, the  Corrosion Proof Fitting court’s decision is the most elaborate statement to date 
of the emerging federal common law of cost-benefit analysis. 
At issue was the EPA’s attempted ban on asbestos, an admittedly carcinogenic 
substance, under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).
136 TSCA allows EPA to 
regulate “unreasonable risks,”
137 and it therefore invites some kind of cost-benefit 
balancing. But the court went far beyond what the statute invited. In addition to allowing 
EPA to engage in cost-benefit balancing, the court required a high degree of  
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134 See Michigan v. EPA, supra note. 
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quantification from EPA, including explicit comparisons of the cost-benefit ratios for 
different degrees of regulation, and also separate discussions of how regulation would 
affect different industries using asbestos.
138 The court thus insisted that the EPA go 
beyond a comparison of “a world with no further regulation” and “a world in which no 
manufacture of asbestos takes p lace” to include as well cost-benefit comparisons under 
different approaches to regulation.
139  
At the same time, the court objected, not to the overall cost-benefit ratio, but to 
the cost-benefit ratios for some areas in which asbestos was to be banned: “[T]he 
agency’s analysis results in figures as high as $74 million per life saved. For example, the 
EPA states that is ban of asbestos pipe will save three lives over the next thirteen years, at 
a cost of $128-277 million (343-76 million per life saved)...; t hat its ban of asbestos 
shingle will cost $23-34 million to save 0.32 statistical lives ($72-106 million per life 
saved); that its ban of asbestos coatings will cost $460181 million to save 2.22 lives ($14-
54 million per life saved)...”
140 With evident incredulity, the court sad that the “EPA 
would have this court believe that Congress...thought that spending $200-300 million to 
save approximately seven lives (approximately $30-40 million per life) over thirteen 
years is reasonable.”
141 All in all, this is an e xceptionally aggressive use of the 
interpretive principle in favor of cost-benefit balancing. The court not only construes 
statutory text in a way that mandates such balancing, but also requires a demonstration 
that particular parts, and subparts, of the relevant regulation satisfy a cost-benefit inquiry. 
III. Underlying Considerations 
What are the foundations of the cost-benefit default principles? What is their 
rationale? Though the various default principles should be evaluated separately, there are 
common concerns in the background. We begin with statutory interpretation in general. 
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  A.  Ambiguity, Absurdity, and Excessive Generality  
1.  Three kinds of default principles. There is nothing new or unusual about default 
principles for statutory interpretation. T hey are ubiquitous. In fact they are inevitable.
142 
Language has no meaning without default principles of many kinds; we use them every 
day. Generally such principles are agreed-upon, so much so that they do not seem to be 
principles at all. They are part of what it means to understand the relevant language. They 
need not even be identified, much less defended. But sometimes the principles are 
contested, or at least subject to contest, and in such cases, they must certainly be 
identified and defended, and the fact that they are being used is obvious to all. 
     We might distinguish three circumstances here.  
    -- The simplest cases involves genuine ambiguity, in the sense that without resort to 
an identifiable default principle, courts really do not know what t he statutory term 
means. Here the default principle will operate as a tie-breaker, authorizing an agency 
to act when the case is otherwise in equipoise. The use of default principles is 
uncontroversial in such cases; without some such principles, cases cannot be decided. 
    -- Less simple cases involve texts that are most naturally or easily taken to forbid the 
agency action, but when there is nonetheless ambiguity. Here the default principles 
are serving as “clear statement” principles––suggesting that the statute will be 
understood to allow the agency to do what it seeks unless Congress expressly says 
otherwise. This is of course a more aggressive use of default principles, pushing 
statutes away from the disfavored terrain. It appears to be the law, for example, that 
agencies will be allowed to consider costs unless Congress expressly prohibits them 
from doing so;
143 this is a clear statement principle, used not only when courts are in 
equipoise. 
    -- The third and most complex cases involves the sort of interpretive problem that 
might be understood to involve  excessive generality. This is the kind of problem 
found when, for example, a statute saying “no vehicles in the park” is applied to a war 
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memorial consisting of a tank used in World War II,
144 or when a nephew who has 
murdered his uncle seeks to inherit under a will that has not been revoked.
145 In many 
legal systems, courts will look behind the language of the statute to prevent an 
outcome that makes no sense and that could not possibly have been intended.
146 This      
      was the court’s suggestion about the de minimis exception in Alabama Power, 
147 and      
      the court’s requirement that EPA consider health-health tradeoffs was clearly     
      understood in similar terms, as an effort to prevent an outcome that would be  
      “bizarre” and hence that Congress could not have wanted.
148 
2.  Sense vs. nonsense. These are the circumstances for using default principles. 
But what is the appropriate content of such principles? This is a large question, and it 
makes sense to begin with established understandings.  
Where meaning is not clear, many time-honored principles are designed to give 
sense and rationality the benefit of the doubt. An old interpretive principle, with roots in 
almost all legal systems,
149 counsels courts to avoid “absurdity”; sometimes this principle 
has been taken into to override statutory language. More particular principles, of 
considerable current importance, disfavor retroactivity
150; require Congress to speak 
clearly if it seeks to create exemptions from the antitrust law; give the benefit of the 
doubt to Native Americans; and say that agencies will not, on their own, be taken to have 
the authority to apply statutes outside the territorial boundaries of the United States.
151 It 
was probably inevitable that confronted with a wide range of regulatory enactments, 
courts would eventually develop a set of analogues for the regulatory state––principles 
that give rationality and sense the benefit of the doubt in the particular context of 
contemporary regulatory law.
152  
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  Each of the cost-benefit default principles is best defended on just this ground––that 
they do give sense and rationality the benefit of the doubt and that Congress should not 
be taken to have mandated irrationality or absurdity. Where Congress has left things 
unclear, agencies, at a minimum, have discretion to move statutes away from (what they 
reasonably consider to be) the domain of senselessness. Notice that defended in this 
modest way, the cost-benefit default principles combine substantive ideas about 
regulatory policy with institutional ones, in the form of a posture of judicial deference, 
allowing agencies room to maneuver.
153 Because agencies are specialized in the topic at 
hand, and because they have a degree of political accountability, they are permitted to do 
what the cost-benefit default principles authorize. If agencies choose to do otherwise, 
there is, on the rationale as stated, nothing wrong with that.  
But we should acknowledge here that it is possible to discern two different strands 
in cases establishing the cost-benefit default principles. Call the first strand 
antiregulatory, and the second strand  technocratic. On the antiregulatory strand, the 
principles are best seen as an effort to block regulation,
154 perhaps on the theory that it is 
frequently illegitimate from the standpoint of liberty, perhaps on the ground that it 
usually does more harm than good. The antiregulatory strand links the principles with 
those prevailing in the discredited  Lochner era,
155 where courts used both constitutional 
and interpretive principles to limit regulation. By contrast, the technocratic strand 
embodies no animus against regulation in the abstract. Indeed, it sees cost-benefit 
analysis as a frequent impetus to regulation, as in the phaseouts of lead and CFCs.
156 For 
                                                                                                                                                 
that courts are pursuing efficiency, economically defined, but that they are converging on a less sectarian, 
more modest set of ideas, allowing agencies to move in directions that can be seen as sensible from a wide 
variety of standpoints. 
153 For a powerful attack on unduly complex canons of construction and a plea for simplicity, see Adrian 
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technocrats, the impetus toward cost-benefit analysis is as much a check on insufficient 
regulation as it is a limitation on excessive controls. 
To the extent that the cost-benefit principles are approved here, it is because and 
to the  extent that they embody the technocratic strand, enlisting policy analysis in the 
service of better regulation. The antiregulatory form is illegitimate, a form of judicial 
hubris. But it should not be denied that both strands are playing a role in the cases. Let us 
now investigate some details. 
B.  De Minimis Exceptions and Acceptable Risks 
The idea that agencies may make de minimis exceptions is an outgrowth of the 
old idea, de minimis non curat lex. If the risk at issue is tiny, the agency is not required to 
eliminate it. Much of the rationale here is a kind of implicit cost-benefit balancing. If 
regulation occurs, both private and public resources will have to be expended in order to 
ensure compliance. When the benefits of regulation are trivial, the agency i s permitted to 
refuse to regulate, on the ground that the costs are likely to outweigh any benefits.
157 
When the benefits of regulation are trivial, no one is likely to have anything to complain 
about if regulation is foregone, and those who are attempting to complain are likely to be 
well-organized private groups with a self-interested agenda, unrelated to the purposes for 
which the statute was enacted.
158 
This understanding has the virtue of helping to account for the courts’ otherwise 
puzzling refusal to allow EPA to make a de minimis exception under the color additive 
provisions of the Delaney Clause.
159 Perhaps these decisions are best attributed to the fact 
that the statutory terms seem quite unambiguous. But as one court emphasized, it is 
unclear if significant costs are actually created by a decision to ban color additives.
160 
While the benefits of a ban are low, the costs are, in the particular circumstances, low as 
well. If the costs of regulation are trivial, perhaps a trivial gain from regulation is justified 
too. The general point is that trivial risks are unlikely to be worth private and public  
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resources, they need not be controlled unless Congress has explicitly said that agencies 
must control them. 
C.  Health-Health Tradeoffs  
In a way the idea of “health-health tradeoffs” is the simplest of all. If agencies are 
imposing health risks at the same time that they are protecting health, they should, at the 
very least, be permitted to take this fact into account. What most matters, after all, is 
whether risks  are being reduced on balance (though distributional and equitable concerns 
can complicate this claim, as discussed below). Other things being equal, it is hardly 
desirable for government to reduce the respiratory risks of ground-level ozone if ground-
level ozone also provides significant protection against cancer and cataracts.
161 The 
agency should be permitted to ask whether this is what it should do, subject to review for 
reasonableness.  
Now this does not mean that a sensible legislature will inevitably ask agencies to 
compare health risks with health benefits. Perhaps an institutional division of labor is 
sought, so that some agencies deal with some risks, whereas other agency attend to 
others.
162 It is imaginable, for example, that an agency entrusted with  promoting fuel 
economy is not supposed to consider safety issues, which are a province of another 
institution. At least if the two agencies are not working at cross purposes, and are 
engaged in some effort at coordination, it is possible that this division of labor makes 
sense. The only claim is that when an agency is aggravating one health problem while it 
is resolving another, it ought to be permitted to take that factor into account unless 
Congress has said otherwise. In any case permission to engage in  health-health balancing 
helps counteract the risk of tunnel vision on the part of regulators. 
At this stage it might be asked why, to many people, health-health analysis seems 
so much less controversial than cost-benefit analysis. Many people are skeptical of the 
idea that costs should be balanced against lives saved
163; but few people are skeptical of 
the idea that lives saved should be balanced against lives lost. The simplest explanation is  
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that people have a great deal of difficulty in trading off life  against dollars, not only 
cognitively but also morally, and the very idea of ascribing an explicit monetary value to 
a (statistical) life remains controversial.
164 When people are asked to weigh health against 
health, the mental operation is far less troublesome. People generally agree that agencies 
should attempt to save more lives on balance, rather than fewer. Note that this is a 
descriptive point about how people tend to think, intended to help explain what might 
seem to be an anomaly; it is not a normative point at all. 
D.  Costs, Feasibility, and Costs vs. Benefits  
Why are agencies presumptively entitled to consider costs? The basic idea must 
be that a “benefits only” approach reflects a kind of tunnel vision, a myopic focus on only 
one of the variety of things that matter. Suppose, for example, that one approach to 
regulation would produce a certain level of air quality benefits, but do so at a cost of $800 
million––and that another competing approach would produce a very slightly lower level 
of air quality benefits, but do so at a cost of $150 million. If costs can be made relevant, 
the agency is permitted to do what seems quite sensible: to save the $650 million on the 
ground that the benefits of the expenditure would not be high enough to justify the 
expenditure.  
Of course it would be necessary to know a great deal more to know how to 
evaluate the particular problem. If the $650 million would mean a significant loss of jobs, 
and if the lower air quality benefits would not result in significant mortality o r morbidity 
effects, it seems most sensible not to expend the resources. But if the $650 million would 
mean slightly reduced profits for producers, or slightly increased prices for a dispensable 
good, and if the air quality benefits would mean a nontrivial reduction in respiratory 
problems for tens of thousands of asthmatics, the case for more stringent regulation is far  
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stronger. The point is not that a bare accounting of costs and benefits tells officials all of 
what they need to know. It is only that a  sensible agency is entitled to, and does, 
“consider” the costs of regulation. If Congress has a particular reason to require 
otherwise, it is permitted to do exactly that. 
Ideas of this sort help support the closely related idea that agencies are 
presumptively permitted to compare costs against benefits, and also to consider whether 
compliance is feasible.
165 As we will see in more detail, the feasibility constraint is both 
ambiguous and from the normative perspective somewhat crude, because there is no 
identifiable point at which regulation becomes “not feasible.” But a feasibility constraint, 
crude though it is, can be defended in the same basic way as the presumption against 
mandatory control of insignificant risks: If compliance is not feasible, there is  a good 
chance that regulation is not worthwhile. The least that can be said is that if regulation is 
so costly that it would force many companies to go out of business, without consequent 
adverse effects for workers, the agency ought to have a very strong  reason for imposing 
it. 
V.   Agency Permission vs. Agency Requirements 
Thus far we have seen what agencies are permitted to do, if Congress is silent on 
the point. But it is necessary to distinguish between cases in which an agency attempts to 
do what cost-benefit principles permit and cases in which an agency refuses to do what 
courts are permitting. We know that for the agency, no legal problem will arise in the first 
set of cases. What about the second? Might the default principles sometimes require 
agencies to follow a particular course? 
A. The Framework 
To answer this question, some brief background is in order. Chevron v. NRDC,
166 
the dominant case in the area, sets out a two-step inquiry for judicial review of agency 
decisions. The first question (“step one”) is whether Congress has “directly decided the 
precise question at issue”––more simply, whether Congress has unambiguously banned  
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what the agency proposes to do.
167 Under  Chevron, agencies are generally permitted to 
construe ambiguous statutes as they see fit. It follows that even without a cost-benefit 
default principle, agencies should be permitted to consider costs so long as the statute is 
ambiguous on the point. When  Chevron is combined with the default principle, the 
overall lesson is exceedingly straightforward: Agencies are permitted to consider costs 
when Congress has not said that they may not.  
Under  Chevron, however, the issue is not finished upon a finding that Congress 
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue. It remains to ask whether the 
agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable (“step two”).
168 When the  American 
Trucking Association court held that the EPA was required to consider the benefits as 
well as the risks of a pollutant, it did so partly on the ground that  the agency’s 
interpretation to the contrary was not reasonable (because it was, in the court’s view, 
“bizarre”
169). It is therefore possible that even if an agency’s decision does not violate 
Chevron step one (because the statute is ambiguous), it will nonetheless violate step 2, if 
the decision can be shown to be arbitrary or “bizarre.” 
B. The Framework Applied 
  Suppose that the agency has refused to allow a de minimis exemption, or engage 
in health-health comparisons, or to consider costs when the statute allows it to do so. If 
the agency has refused to do what the cost-benefit principles permit it to do, the analysis 
would proceed in the following steps.  
1. The first question would involve  Chevron step one: Has EPA violated 
unambiguous congressional instructions, or transgressed some judgment made “directly” 
by Congress? At first glance, the answer, by hypothesis, will be No. The statute is 
ambiguous rather than clear. The only possible response is that the cost-benefit default 
rule now operates as a kind o f canon of construction, serving as part of the inquiry in 
Chevron step 1.  
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      The argument is adventurous, but not as much so as it might appear. Many canons 
of construction now work in precisely that way.
170 Consider, for example, the following 
canons: statutes will not be understood to apply outside the territorial borders of the 
United States
171; statutes will not be understood to apply retroactively
172; statutes will not 
be taken to raise serious constitutional questions.
173 In all these cases, agency 
interpretations do not prevail under Chevron step 1, not because Congress has expressed 
its will clearly, but because Congress is required to speak with clarity if it wishes 
agencies to act in the way that they seek. Perhaps the cost-benefit default principle should 
be understood in similar terms.  
This is indeed possible, but it would require a significant stretch from existing 
law. The canons discussed above have a degree of longevity, indeed a straightforward 
justification from longstanding traditions.
174 The cost-benefit default principles have not 
yet acquired the status of the canons of construction that operate as part of Chevron step                                                      
1. It is therefore doubtful that an agency’s refusal to proceed in the manner suggested by 
the cost-benefit default principles would be struck down under step 1.
175 
2. The second question would involve  Chevron step 2: Is the agency’s 
interpretation of the statute “reasonable”? I suggest that the foregoing considerations, 
supporting the default rules in general, suggest the basis for a particular presumption: The 
agency’s interpretation is to be presumed unreasonable if it interprets the statute to fail to 
make de minimis exemptions, to disallow health-health tradeoffs, not to consider costs or 
feasibility, to regulate insignificant risks, or to ban cost-benefit balancing.
176 Of these 
various possibilities, the presumption of unreasonableness is strongest when the agency is 
attempting to regulate a de minimis risk or refusing to consider health-health tradeoffs. In 
such cases, the agency’s decision seems most obviously unreasonable. Why should  
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expenditures be required for trivial risks? Why should the agency be permitted to 
increase overall risks? These questions do not have obvious answers.  
The argument that agencies would be unreasonable to reject the other default 
principles is less clear. But even in such cases, any reasonable judgment will ordinarily 
be based on some kind of weighing of costs and benefits, and not on an inquiry i nto 
benefits alone.
177 Return to  Michigan v. EPA, and suppose that in some states, the costs 
of reducing the “significant contribution” would be exceedingly high, whereas the 
benefits would be low, in light of the fact that the risks associated with the relevant 
concentrations of ozone are not severe. If the costs would be high and the benefits low, 
on what rationale should be the EPA refuse even to consider the former? Here too there 
appears to be no good answer. 
Notice that what is involved here is a presumption only, and it is rebuttable. It is 
possible to imagine agency explanations that would show why its view––to reject one or 
another of the cost-benefit default principles––is reasonable. It is that question to which I 
now turn. 
C. Rebutting the Presumption 
In several contexts, Congress, as well as agencies and courts, could reasonably 
find the default principles inapplicable. The following catalogue might be taken to 
identify circumstances in which agencies might sensibly decide not to go in the direction 
suggested by the default principles  – and also in which a reasonable legislature might ban 
agencies from going in that direction. 
1.  Regulating de minimis risks: the case of low benefits and administrative 
difficulties. Suppose that an agency has discretion to interpret the relevant 
statute so as to allow exemptions of de minimis risks for (as an illustration) 
carcinogenic color additives in food. Suppose that the agency refuses to 
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       interpret the statute this way, because (a) the benefits of color food additives       
are generally low (noncarcinogenic color additives will do about as well), (b)     
it is not always simple to distinguish between weak and strong carcinogens,  
and (c) a flat rule will be simpler to administer. At least at first glance, this  
sort of explanation seems fully reasonable. It would distinguish the case from  
one in which the agency attempts to interpret the OSHA statute in such a way  
as to call for costly regulation of insignificant risks. 
2.  Regulating risks that might or might not be de minimis: the case of scientific 
ignorance. Suppose that the agency attempts to regulate risks that (it agrees) 
cannot be shown to be significant. Suppose that it contends not that it will 
understand the statute to cover demonstrably insignificant o r demonstrably de 
minimis risks, but instead to cover instead risks that, in light of existing 
scientific information, might be small but might be large––a distinction that 
cannot be made with existing tools and in light of existing scientific 
understandings. In other words, the agency interprets the statute to allow 
regulation where the benefits might be significant, but cannot be shown to be 
significant given existing knowledge.  
This does not seem to be an unreasonable interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute. Perhaps the agency should be required to identify the range of 
potential benefits, so as to ensure that the possible gains, discounted by the 
probability that they will be realized, is sufficient to make regulation 
worthwhile. It is not hard to imagine cases of this kind. The basic point is that 
when scientific understanding is primitive, it can be perfectly reasonable to 
regulate risks that might be small but might be large. Indeed, such regulation 
might even survive cost-benefit balancing, notwithstanding the real possibility 
that when more is known, the risk will turn out to be de minimis. 
3.  Disregarding costs at one stage of a multistage inquiry. Might it be reasonable 
for an agency to interpret a statute not to allow consideration of costs? In 
some cases, this would indeed be reasonable. Recall that under the Clean Air  39 
 
      Act, the EPA is supposed to set standards at the level that, with an “adequate   
margin of safety,” are “requisite to protect the public health.”
178 At first glance 
it might appear quite unreasonable for the agency not to consider costs if it has  
the discretion to do so. Whether it is worthwhile to produce a certain level of 
benefits would seem to depend, at least in part, on the cost of achieving those 
benefits. But suppose that the EPA urges (as it has for a number of years
179) 
that costs will be considered not in setting standards in the first instance 
(where health is the sole consideration), but at other, later stages, in the 
development of state implementation plans and in insistence on deadlines for 
compliance. In such a system, the EPA would say that national ambient air 
quality standards are based only on an inquiry into issues of health, that this is 
a benefits-based judgment, but that the decision how and when to meet those 
standards, made through complex procedures at the state and federal levels, 
will consider costs as well as benefits.  
         In fact this is how the Clean Air Act now operates.
180 National standards 
are issued in a cost-blind manner, but costs emphatically p lay a part at other 
stages of the process, in the design and enforcement of state implementation 
plans. Whether or not it is ultimately convincing, this kind of procedural 
defense of “health only” judgments seems perfectly reasonable. From this it 
follows  that even if the relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act are taken to 
be ambiguous,
181 it would be reasonable to understand national standard-
setting to be cost-blind, not because cost-blindness is itself reasonable, but 
because costs are taken into account at later stages of a multistage inquiry.
182 
Whether it would be better for costs to be considered throughout is an issue on    
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            which reasonable people can differ. This is a highly pragmatic question, on 
which general enthusiasm for cost-benefit balancing is not decisive. 
4.  Disregarding particular costs as statutorily irrelevant. There are other arenas in 
which costs might reasonably be disregarded; at least agencies might 
disregard costs of a certain kind. Suppose, for example, that the FAA 
concluded that the needs of the air tour industry were entitled to no weight in 
issuing regulations controlling noise at the Grand Canyon. Under a different 
administration, the FAA might believe that the statute is best understood to 
ensure that those who enjoy the Grand Canyon can do so with a minimum of 
noise––and that the adverse effects on the air tour industry are irrelevant, even 
if this means that fewer people will be able to enjoy the Grand Canyon. At 
first glance, this is an entirely reasonable judgment. Administrations and 
administrators might make different decisions on that question. 
5.  Disregarding feasibility as part of overall balancing. Is it ever reasonable for 
an agency to ignore the question whether regulation is feasible for the 
industry? Might the F AA choose to interpret an ambiguous statute so as to 
impose an air quality regulation that would not be feasible for the air tour 
industry over the Grand Canyon, so that the relevant companies could not stay 
in business? At first glance, feasibility seems  relevant; but it is possible to 
imagine cases in which an agency might reasonably choose to interpret a 
statute to allow rules that are not feasible. The agency might believe that it is 
more important to reduce noise levels than to allow the continued operation of 
the air tour industry. When judgments of this kind are made, the agency is 
effectively engaging in a kind of cost-benefit balancing, one that justifies 
regulation that is not feasible. Of course an agency might engage in 
technology-forcing, though usually this approach depends on a judgment that 
regulation is indeed feasible, because more advanced technologies are feasible 
to develop. 
6.  Rights and irreversibility. Thus far the discussion has emphasized pragmatic 
or instrumental considerations. But are there contexts in which the cost-
benefit default principles are inapplicable in principle? In many domains, of  41 
 
            course, cost-benefit balancing fails to describe the operation of law; rights-
based thinking often “blocks” resorts to costs, or at  least costs of a certain 
kind.
183 Ordinarily ideas of this sort play a role in constitutional law
184; but 
such thinking is not foreign to regulatory policy. The most vivid example is 
the Endangered Species Act,
185 which forbids agency from engaging in action 
that would threaten members of endangered species even if a balancing test 
would appear to justify the action.
186 In holding that the statute disallow 
balancing, the Court relied on what is said was the unambiguous meaning of 
the text.
187 But as Justice Powell showed in dissent, the language was not so 
clear as to disallow invocation of a strong default principle, one that would 
justify a degree of balancing.
188 Can the outcome in the case be explained in a 
legal system pervaded by cost-benefit default principles? 
Perhaps it cannot be. Perhaps the Court’s decision is an anachronism, 
inconsistent with contemporary law. But there is another explanation. The 
Endangered Species Act is concerned with preventing genuinely irreversible 
losses, and at least in the context of human activities that cause extinction, 
perhaps the statute is best taken to be rooted in a theory of rights, one that 
rebuts the presumption in favor of cost-benefit balancing. Now it is possible 
that some kind of “meta” balancing justifies a flat prohibition on actions that 
would destroy members of an endangered species. The benefits may be 
thought to be so high, and the costs usually so low, as to support such a 
prohibition, disallowing balancing in particular cases. But this way of 
understanding the statute seems to misconceive its foundations, which lie in a 
judgment that human beings should not knowingly bring about the extinction  
of other species,
189 at least in the absence of truly extraordinary 
circumstances.
190  
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It is possible to generalize from this example. Where regulatory policy is 
designed to ensure against irreversible damage, or otherwise to prevent the 
violation of rights, the cost-benefit default principles are displaced. In most 
domains of regulatory policy, however, what is involved is not the danger of 
irreversible loss, but instead issues of degree, and hence the presumption 
remains intact. 
VI.  Unsettled Questions: Specifying the Principles 
The cost-benefit default principles leave many open questions. They are abstract 
and general. Courts have done extremely little to particularize them; agencies have done 
somewhat more, but they have made only a start.
191 It is here that a great deal of law will 
be made in the next decades. I offer a few remarks on the crucial issues. 
A.  The Incipient Common Law of Acceptable Risks 
What makes a risk “significant” or “de minimis”? Here the law is extremely ill-
developed. Perhaps we can find some agreed-upon standards for labeling a risk de 
minimis. If the risk is less than that created by eating a moderate number of peanuts with 
legally permitted aflotoxin levels, or from living in Denver rather than New York for a 
week every year, the case seems relatively easy. Risks of this little are the kind that 
people ignore each day. But how should we evaluate (say) a cancer risk, from (say) a 
lifetime exposure to a certain carcinogenic substance, of one in one million? One in 
100,000? One in ten million? Does it matter if the exposed population is large or small?  
These are the pivotal questions. For guidance, it might be noted that the 
International Commission on Radiological Protection recommends that environmental 
factors should not be allowed to cause an incremental cancer risk, for those exposed over 
a lifetime, of 3 in 1000 or more.
192 But the practice of American agencies is highly  
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variable, with the EPA’s acceptable range varying from 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 1,000,000.
193 
In the Benzene Case, the plurality of the Supreme Court attempted to give some 
clarification, making a distinction between two quantitatively different levels of risk. If 
the risk of getting cancer from drinking a glass of water is one in a billion, the plurality 
said, it could not possibly be considered significant.
  194 By contrast, a fatality risk of 
1/1000 from regular inhalation of gasoline vapors “might  well” be considered 
significant.
195 OSHA has built on this simple idea in issuing its own regulations. Thus the 
agency has said that a lifetime risk of 1.64/1000 will be counted as significant, whereas a 
lifetime risk of 0.6 in 100,000 “may be approaching a  level that can be viewed as 
safe.”
196 
This is certainly a start, and in light of the Supreme Court’s statements, perhaps 
OSHA’s approach is sufficient to survive judicial scrutiny. Certainly an effort at 
quantification is a helpful way of clarifying the basis for the agency’s decision, especially 
laudable in light of the slipperiness of the idea of ‘significance.” But many questions 
might be asked. In deciding whether a risk is trivial or significant, it would seem 
important to ask not only about the level of the risk faced by each person, but also about 
the size of the exposed population.
197 If two people in the United States face a lifetime 
risk of 2/10,000, perhaps the risk should not be deemed significant in light of the fact that 
it is overwhelmingly likely that no fatalities will be suffered. We could easily imagine a 
challenge to a decision to treat such a risk as “significant” as a matter of law.
198 Certainly 
the agency should explain any failure to take account of the small number of exposed 
people––even though it would probably be reasonable, as a matter of law, for the agency 
to concern itself with probabilities faced by individuals, at least if it is not permitted to 
engage in cost-benefit balancing.   
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      At the same time, a statistically small risk, if faced by large numbers of people, 
might well be deemed significant. If twenty million people face a lifetime risk of 
1/200,000, one hundred people are expected to die––far from a trivial number. We could  
easily imagine a challenge to an agency decision t o treat the latter risk as “insignificant”; 
indeed that challenge should probably succeed. The point raises serious doubts about the 
Supreme Court plurality’s confidence that a risk of one in a billion, from drinking a glass 
of water, could not be deemed significant. If each person drinks five glasses of water per 
day, and if there are 260 million Americans, the one-in-a-billion risk no longer seems so 
small, converted into expected annual fatalities (474.5, hardly a trivial number). We 
should therefore conclude that it is at least reasonable for agencies to consider risks to be 
“significant,” and not de minimis, if the probability is very low but the exposed 
population quite large. It is also reasonable to suggest that if the probability is very low 
but the exposed population sufficiently large, a high number of expected fatalities should 
require the agency to consider the risk “significant” as a matter of law.  
There is an additional problem. Both OSHA and the Supreme Court seem to focus 
on the “lifetime” r isk––that is, the risk that would come from being exposed to a 
substance for all of one’s working life. Under OSHA, it does seem that this focus is 
required by the statute, at least for toxic substances, for which the relevant provision is 
expressly drawn  in terms of lifetime exposure.
199 But in the abstract, and under other 
provisions, we should not be focusing on the risk, of fatality or anything else, that would 
come from a lifetime of exposure,  except to the extent that all, most, or many people 
actually  have a lifetime of exposure. Imagine, for example, that almost all workers in the 
relevant industry are exposed, not for their lifetimes, but for five years or less. What risk 
do they face? This is the crucial question. Perhaps the risk, for them, is a small fraction of 
the lifetime risk. Sensible policy requires the government to reduce the risks that people 
actually face, not the risk that people fancifully face. When an agency has discretion, the 
agency should look not at lifetime risk, but at actual risk.   
           What all this suggests is that when agencies are asking whether risks are 
significant, they ought to move in the direction of setting out a range of “expected  
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benefits,” in terms of mortality, morbidity, and other relevant variables.
200 These 
variables could be aggregated into some sort of total number, below which a risk would 
be treated as insignificant. Of course there will be a large degree of guesswork in 
generating the relevant numbers. Of course too there will be a degree of arbitrariness in 
choosing the precise point at which risks are no longer significant. But without movement 
in the direction of quantification, it will not be possible to produce informed, transparent, 
and consistent policy.
201 Thus an effort to quantify the level of  risk that would be deemed 
acceptable would replace the current system, with its high degree of inconsistency and 
guesswork, with something like a common law of acceptable risks.
202 
B.  The Meaning of Feasibility: No “On-Off” Switch 
What does it mean to say that  regulation must be “feasible”? In the abstract, a 
requirement that regulation be “feasible” might seem to invite cost-benefit balancing. In 
the private sector, a “feasibility study” is essentially an exercise in cost-benefit balancing. 
But as we have seen, a feasibility requirement involves no balancing of costs and 
benefits.
203 It asks instead about cost-only inquiry into whether achievement of the 
regulatory goal is “practicable.”
204 
Assume, for example, that a regulation would cost $800 million, and that in  the 
process it would save 10 lives per year; assume also that the exposed population is 
relatively small, so that each of the exposed workers faces a lifetime risk of well over 1 in 
1000. It is easy to imagine that this regulation would be entirely feasible, in the sense that 
the industry would face no technical problems in meeting it, and also in the sense that it 
would be practicable for industry to bear the cost. But it is also easy to imagine that such 
a regulation would fail cost-benefit analysis, in t he sense that $800 million expense 
would not be justified by the (relatively lower) monetized savings. If a statistical life is 
valued at $5 million, for example, the benefits ($50 million) would be only one-eighth the 
cost. But it would be wrong to think that cost-benefit analysis is more “antiregulatory”  
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than a feasibility constraint, for we can easily imagine a regulation that might not be 
feasible, but that might satisfy a requirement of cost-benefit balancing. Suppose, for 
example, that a regulation would cost $2 billion, that industry could not bear that cost  
without many business failures, but that the regulation would save 5000 lives. In some 
cases, the cost-benefit requirement is more protective, not less protective, of intended 
beneficiaries of regulatory programs.  
So far, perhaps, things are clear enough. But there is a problem here as well. Most 
important: Feasibility is not an on-off switch. Any significant increase in costs is likely to  
prove “not feasible” for at least some companies. As t he costs increase, the number of 
companies for whom the regulation proves “not feasible” will increase too. In these 
circumstances, it seems extremely artificial to say that at a certain point, regulation 
becomes “not feasible.” Perhaps there is a set point at which regulation, by virtue of its 
stringency, establishes a sudden, large-scale increase in the number of companies who 
cannot bear the cost of regulatory controls while continuing in business. But it is more 
likely that as the costs grow, the number of companies who cannot bear the cost grows 
too, with several specific points at which that number spikes upwards. In these 
circumstances, what sense is made by a “feasibility” constraint? At first glance, very 
little. Just as safety is not an absolute, but a matter of degree, so too for feasibility. Law 
that says otherwise appears to substitute a comforting but misleading formula for a 
serious confrontation with the issues at stake. 
 Perhaps there is an intelligible answer here. Perhaps Congress wants to  say that 
for most regulations, companies must comply, unless a large number of them can show 
that they cannot comply and continue. And certainly this is a relatively simple inquiry in 
most cases. What makes little sense is the suggestion that agencies can  pick a single point 
that is “feasible,” and go to, but not beyond, that point. 
In these circumstances, how can we account for the evident popularity of 
requirements that regulation be “feasible” or “achievable”? There are several 
possibilities, suggesting  that the feasibility standard might be justified by reference to 
institutional considerations. From the standpoint of those concerned with safety and the 
environment, a cost-benefit standard might be thought to introduce undue opportunities  
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for industry to stall the process, perhaps because of the prospect and actuality of judicial 
review. 
205 A requirement that regulation must be “feasible’ greatly improves agency’s 
chances in court. In fact this conclusion is well-supported by the record of agencies on 
appeal; no agency has  ever lost a challenge to the feasibility of its regulation, while cost-
benefit requirements have proved troublesome for agencies in court.
206  
This is a point about the goals of supporters of environmental regulation. From 
the standpoint of Congress, there is a separate point. A statute that expressly refers to 
cost-benefit balancing seems to invite complaints about the decision to trade off lives for 
dollars; hence statutes that embody CBA are unpopular in many circles. Legislators who 
seek to avoid complaints about CBA, while also seeking to impose a constraint on 
excessive regulation, might naturally be drawn to feasibility requirements. From the 
standpoint of industry, perhaps “feasibility” statutes are not so troublesome if it is 
possible to maintain control over the agency’s docket and over appropriations, so as to 
ensure that draconian statutes are, in practice, far less than that. 
These points help explain the appeal of feasibility constraints. But they do not tell 
us what such constraints mean. The best answer, not entirely satisfactory, is that a 
regulation becomes infeasible if it would result in significant dislocations in the industry, 
in the form of large numbers of business failures, substantial losses of jobs, or the 
equivalent.
207 Ideas of this sort are qualitative, rather than quantitative, and in 
implementation, they leave a great deal of discretion to agencies. What might be expected 
in the future is a more quantitative account from agencies implementing regulations that 
are said to be feasible, or refusing to impose regulations said to be infeasible. 
C. Considering Costs 
What of principles (or statutes) that ask agencies to “take into consideration” costs 
(and other relevant factors)? Statutes of this kind typically include an “achievability”  
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constraint as well, one that operates, in practice, in the same way as a feasibility 
requirement. What is added by the idea that agencies should also take costs into 
consideration?  
            The answer seems to be that such provisions give agencies the discretion not to go 
to the full extent of feasibility if the costs of doing so are disproportionately high. 
Suppose, for example, that a regulation would cost $800 million and that it would save 10 
lives annually. Suppose too that it is entirely feasible. If the agency is permitted to take 
costs into consideration, presumably it is permitted to impose a less intrusive regulation, 
or perhaps not to regulate at all. The foregoing sentence is qualified because the idea that 
costs must be taken “into consideration” does not say how much  weight costs must have; 
it does not say, by itself, to what extent agencies must treat costs as relevant to the 
ultimate decision. Presumably it would be unlawful for an agency to ignore costs 
altogether. I f the agency were permitted to do this, the “consideration” requirement 
would be empty. At a minimum, then, the agency must discuss them and explain its 
decision in light of the cost. Similarly, an agency that is allowed to “consider” costs, but 
need not t ake account of feasibility, is authorized to soften regulation by selecting less 
expensive and also less effective means.
208 Hard questions would arise if an agency 
authorized to “consider” costs chooses means that are much less expensive but also much 
less effective. 
This is a procedural understanding of the “consideration” requirement, one that 
has precedent under other statutes.
209 But is there a substantive requirement as well? Must 
an agency give some kind of weight to costs, in addition to discussing them? Probably 
there is. An agency decision would be unlawful if it gave no weight whatsoever to costs, 
as, for example, through the choice of a regulation that would do only trivially more good 
than one that would be 50% less costly. An agency decision would also be doubtful if it 
made costs an overriding factor as, for example, by choosing a regulation that is slightly 
less expensive (say, $1 million annually) but also much less effective (say, because it 
would leave 30 additional deaths annually). On this view, a requirement that an agency  
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take costs into consideration falls short of cost-benefit analysis, in the sense that the 
agency is expected to give principal weight to the initially identified factor, and from 
there to make adjustments because of costs. An agency would run into difficulty if it 
transformed costs into the overriding statutory factor  or if it gave costs no substantive 
consideration at all. These are the polar cases for administrative illegality. Cases that fall 
between the poles should present no serious conceptual issue. 
D. Of Costs and Benefits 
It remains to discuss the largest problem of all. If cost-benefit balancing is 
required, what is an agency permitted to do? Of course there are hard issues of valuation 
here. If an agency values a  life at $10 million, it will produce outcomes very different 
from those that would be follow if it valued a life at $500,000. Is an agency permitted to 
value a life at, say, $100 million, or at $50,000?
210  
1.  Basic issues of valuation: the standard approach. For several decades, agencies 
have undertaken cost-benefit analysis of major regulations, even when cost-benefit 
analysis is not the basis for decision but is merely a matter of informing the public about 
the consequences of proposed courses of action.
211 But how are costs and benefits to be 
calculated? In principle, the issue is often easier to resolve on the cost side, though the 
practical problems here can be very serious, especially in light of industry’s incentive to 
overestimate costs. With respect t o benefits, the now-standard approach involves an 
effort to calculate people’s “willingness to pay” for the various goods at stake. 
Sophisticated (though still controversial
212) methods are available for this purpose.
213  
There remains a good deal of variation across agencies, with statistical lives being 
valued at between $1.5 million and $5.8 million.
214 But willingness to pay is the general  
basis for undertaking calculations. It is on the basis of this sort of analysis that the EPA 
recently compiled the following table,
215 which can be taken as representative: 
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Table 1  Willingness-to-Pay Estimates (Mean Values) 
Health Endpoint  Mean WTP Value per Incident 
(1990 $) 
Mortality 
    Life saved 





     All Respiratory Illnesses, all ages 
     Pneumonia, age < 65 
     COPD, age > 65 
     Ischemic Heart Disease, age < 65 
     Congestive Heart Failure, age > 65 








Chronic Bronchitis  $260,000 
Upper Respiratory Symptoms  $19 
Lower Respiratory Symptoms  $12 
Acute Bronchitis  $45 
Acute Respiratory Symptoms (any of 19)  $18 
Asthma  $32 
Shortness of Breath  $5.30 
Sinusitis and Hay Fever  Not monetized 
Work Loss Days  $83 
Restricted Activity Days (RAD) 
     Minor RAD 




Worker Productivity  $1 per worker per 10% change in ozone 
Visibility: Residential 
 
$14 per unit decrease in deciview per 
household 
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                 Recreational  Range of $7.30 to $ 11 per unit decrease in 
deciview per household (see U.S. EPA, 
1997a) 
Household Soiling Damage  $2.50 per household per •g/m
3 
 
  To become intelligible, of course, these numbers must be combined with an 
assessment of the problems that would be averted with  various approaches to regulation. 
As an example of such an assessment, consider the following: 
 
Table 2: Proposed PM10 Standard (50/150 • •g/m
3 ) 99th Percentile 
  National Annual Health Incidence Reductions 
Estimates are incremental to the current ozone and PM NAAQS:  (year = 2010) 
ENDPOINT    Partial Attainment Scenario 




  Daily PM2.5  (• •g/m
3)  150 
*1. Mortality: short-term exposure 
                          long-term exposure 
360 
340 
*2. Chronic Bronchitis  6,800 
Hospital Admissions: 
   *3. all respiratory (all ages) 
all resp. (ages 65+) 
pneumonia (ages 65+) 
COPD (ages 65+) 
   *4. Congestive heart failure  








*6. Acute Bronchitis  1,100 
*7. Lower Respiratory Symptoms  
*8. Upper Respiratory Symptoms 






asthma attacks  8,800 
*9. Work Loss Days  106,000 
*10. Minor Restricted Activity Days (MRADs)  879,000 
 
A simple exercise of multiplication, putting the two tables together, will generate 
monetized  benefits, which can then be compared with monetized costs. Of course it is 
possible to challenge the numbers in both tables. Perhaps the agency has understated or 
overstated the number of lives saved or chronic bronchitis cases; perhaps the agency has 
overvalued or undervalued the dollar value of life or other health benefits. But the basic 
method increasingly dominates administrative practice. 
2.  Legal floors and ceilings. When would a given cost-benefit ratio be held to be 
unlawful? A reasonable agency might begin with numbers near the middle of both market 
valuations
216 and government valuations
217––in the case of a statistical life, somewhere 
between $3 million and $7 million.
218 If an agency seeks to deviate from those numbers, 
it should explain why. The basic idea is that there should be a presumption in favor of 
adherence to the normal range, with an explanation of departures from the numbers thus 
indicated. 
A legitimate risk in allowing departures is that the stated rationale will conceal an 
effort to placate powerful private groups not having a strong claim to governmental 
assistance.
219 Notwithstanding this risk, there are several possible grounds for making 
adjustments. For example, an agency might make a reasonable upward adjustment if it 
believes that children are largely at risk––perhaps because more life-years are at stake, 
perhaps because children are unable to protect themselves and hence have a special 
equitable claim to government resources. A downward adjustment would similarly be 
lawful if the agency finds that mostly old people are at risk, so that any extensions of 
lives would produce a low level of savings in terms of life-years. Or the agency might  
                                                 
216 See W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J Legal Stud (2000). 
217 See Stephen Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 30-31 (1999); Matthew Adler and 
Eric Posner, supra note. 
218 But see Robert Frank and Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, U Chi L Rev 
(forthcoming 2001) (urging inflation of these numbers). 
219 See Viscusi, supra note (documenting abuses of this kind). 53 
 
   
reasonably conclude that special attention should be given to risks faced by poor people 
or African-Americans, on the ground that existing injustice is compounded in a situation 
in which health and environmental dangers are thus concentrated. Agencies should also 
be permitted to take into account the fact that people care about relative economic 
position, not only absolute economic position, and thus to adjust market valuations 
upwards.
220 And perhaps the agency could employ “incidence analysis” to conclude that 
regulation should go forward notwithstanding the fact that benefits exceed costs. If, for 
example, the benefits are $800 million, but enjoyed mostly by low-income workers, 
whereas the costs are $900 million, but faced mostly by consumers generally, it seems 
reasonable for the agency to go forward, at least if Congress has not expressly precluded 
that judgment. 
While these points give agencies a degree of flexibility, they do not give them 
carte blanche, because they operate in limited domains, and because they come with a 
duty of reasoned explanation. This duty is procedural, but it is far more than that. In the 
Corrosion Proof Fittings case, for example, it is hard to see how the agency could have 
justified the extreme cost-benefit ratios that applied to certain bans on asbestos.
221 
3.  The discount rate. Perhaps the most difficult issue here, from t he theoretical 
point of view, involves the selection of the appropriate discount rate. How should the 
agency value future gains and losses? In terms of ultimate outcomes, the choice matters a 
great deal. If an agency chooses a discount rate of 2%, the outcome will be very different 
from what it would be an agency chooses a discount rate of 10%; the benefits calculation 
will shift dramatically as a result. If a human life is valued at $8 million, and if an agency 
chooses a 10% discount rate, a life saved 100 years from now is worth only $581.
222 “At 
a discount rate of five percent, one death next year counts for more than a billion deaths  
 
 
                                                 
220 See Robert Frank and Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, U Chi L Rev 
(forthcoming 2001). 
221 947 F.2d 1201 (5
th Cir. 1991). 
222 See Michael Gerrard, Demons and Angels in Hazardous Waste Regulation, 92 NW L Rev 706, 742-43 
(1998). 54 
 
   
in 500 years.”
223 A key question is therefore: What legal constraints should be imposed 
on the agency’s choice?
224  
My basic conclusion is that it is much harder to untangle the theoretical issue than 
to identify the appropriate posture of reviewing courts. In this highly technical area, 
courts should adopt a posture of deference, requiring agencies only to produce a 
reasonable explanation for their choice and to show a degree of consistency. Part of the 
reason for deference is the extreme complexity of the underlying issues. Part of the 
reason is the risk that an aggressive judicial posture would contribute to the “ossification” 
of  rulemaking
225––a particular problem in this setting, because any particular discount 
rate will be easy to challenge, with reasonable arguments suggesting that it is too low or 
too high.
226 To understand these points, some details are in order.   
Usually s tatutes are silent on the question of appropriate discount rate. In fact I 
have been unable to find  any statute that specifies a discount rate for agencies to follow. 
On judicial review, the question will therefore involve a claim that the agency’s choice is 
arbitrary. Here the national government shows strikingly (and inexplicably) variable 
practices. The Office of Management and Budget suggests a 7% discount rate,
227 
departing from a 10% rate in the 1980s.
228 But agencies are not bound by OMB 
guidelines, and  they have ranged from as low as 3% (Food and Drug Administration, 
Department of Housing and Urban development) to as high as 10% (EPA).
229 In fact the 
same agency sometimes endorses different discount rates for no apparent reason––with 
EPA, for example, selecting a 3% rate for regulation of lead-based paint as compared to 
7% for regulation of drinking water, and 10% rates, respectively, for regulation of 
emissions form locomotives.
230 
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      From the purely economic standpoint, there are serious conundrums here.
231  The 
impetus for discounting future effects stems from the judgment that in the context of 
money, discounting future benefits and losses is entirely rational, even simple: A dollar 
today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow. There are two reasons: investment value (or  
opportunity cost) and pure time preference.
232 A dollar today can be invested, and for this 
reason it is worth more than a dollar a year from now. An emphasis on the investment 
value of money yields a discount rate of roughly 5%-7%. Quite apart  from this point, 
people generally seem to have a preference for receiving money sooner rather than later. 
People value current consumption more than they value future consumption; for this 
reason alone, $1000 is worth more today than it is in a decade. An inquiry into pure time 
preference produces discount rates of 1%-3%. Though they lead to different numbers, 
both points justify discounting future income gains and losses. 
So far, so good. The problem is that these points are not easily taken to justify a 
discount rate for the nonmonetary benefits of regulation. If a regulation will save ten lives 
this year, and ten years annually for the next ten years, it cannot plausibly be urged that 
the future savings are worth less than the current savings, on the ground that a current life 
saved can be immediately “invested.” The point about investment value, or the 
opportunity cost of using capital, seems utterly irrelevant here. With time preference, 
things are less clear. Perhaps people would rather save ten lives today than ten lives in a 
decade. But it is unclear that this is so; and even if it is, what moral status would such a 
time preference have? Probably it makes sense to say that it would be worse for you to 
lose your limb now than to lose it in ten years; in the latter case, you will have ten years 
of use of the limb. And probably it makes sense to say that agencies should attend to life-
years saved, not only lives saved. But holding this constant, the death of a thirty-five year 
old in 2004 does not seem worth more than the death of a thirty-five year old in 2024. 
These points suggest that it is important to distinguish two issues that go under 
the name of “discounting” and that have yet to be separated in administrative practice: (a) 
latent harms, in the form of exposures whose consequences will occur late in someone’s  
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lifetime; and (b) harms to future generations.
233 It is reasonable to say that latent harms 
should count for less than immediate ones, since they remove few years from people’s 
lives. Some kind of discount rate makes sense, although OMB’s 7% figure is probably 
too high.
234 The case of harms to future generations, or people not yet born seems 
different, and in that case the grounds for discounting monetary benefits seem quite 
inapplicable. For this reason no discounting may well be appropriate for the nonmonetary  
benefits of regulation.
235 On this view, a life-year saved is a life-year saved, and it does 
not matter, for purposes of valuation, when the saving occurs.  
           But there is a major objection to this way of proceeding: It would appear to require 
truly extraordinary sacrifices from the present for the sake of the (infinite) future. Perhaps 
the “failure to discount would leave all generations at a subsistence level of existence, 
because benefits would be postponed perpetually for the future.”
236 On the other hand, it 
is not clear that this objection is convincing. Technological and other advances made by 
the current generation benefit future generations as well, and hence impoverishment of 
the current generation would inevitably harm those who will come later.
237 In any case 
there is a hard ethical question here––how much the current generation should suffer for 
the benefit of the future––and a judgment against discounting would not answer that 
question unless we were sure that as a matter of policy, we should be engaging in 
maximizing some aggregate welfare function.
238 It is not at all clear that this form of 
maximization is the appropriate choice to make. 
At this point it should be clear that agencies asked to engage in cost-benefit 
analysis have no clear path to an appropriate choice of discount rate. My topic, however, 
is not regulatory policy, but the implementation of the cost-benefit default principles. In 
the face of these conundrums, the most that a reviewing court can require is a rationale 
for the agency’s choice that is both articulated and reasonable. There are several  
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possibilities here,
239 suggesting what courts should and should not do. They should not 
require costs and benefits t o have the same discount rate, at least not if costs are to be 
absorbed in terms of dollars and benefits will come in terms of fatalities and illnesses 
averted. It follows that in  Corrosion Proof Fittings case, the court of appeals was quite 
wrong to ask E PA to produce an “apples-to-apples comparison, even if this entails 
discounting benefits of a non-monetary nature.”
240 In addition, courts should not simply 
defer to agency decisions as a “policy choice,” as did one court in an unusually complex 
setting.
241 What is necessary is some kind of explanation for the choice. But good 
explanations can be given for a wide range of choices––between, say, a discount rate of 
0% (for future generations, not latent harms) and 7%. So long as the agency gives a 
sensible rationale and departs from it only on the basis of articulated reasons, courts 
should respect the choice. The value judgments here can be reasonably disputed, and they 
should be made democratically, not judicially. It follows that in the context of discount 
rates, as elsewhere, the common law of cost-benefit analysis is to be developed at the 
administrative level, subject only to judicial review for reasonableness. 
VII.  Conclusion 
In this Article I have attempted to identify the cost-benefit default principles, to 
defend their use, and to explore their meaning for the future. In the face of statutory 
ambiguity, courts are now permitting agencies to refuse to regulate when a significant 
risk is not shown; to refuse to regulate beyond the point where regulation is not feasible; 
to consider costs; and to engage in a form of cost-benefit balancing. At their least 
intrusive, the cost-benefit default rules  allow the agency to go in the suggested direction 
when the statute is unclear. At their most intrusive, the principles  require the agency to 
act in the way they suggest unless Congress has unambiguously said otherwise.   
I have argued on behalf of both the least and most intrusive version of the cost-
benefit default rules, by suggesting that they are likely to give sense and rationality the 
benefit of the doubt. At the same time, I have urged that the argument on their behalf is  
                                                 
239 For a good discussion, see Daniel Farber, Ecopragmatism (1999). 
240 Corrosion Proof Fittings, supa note, 947 F.2d at 1218. 
241 880 F 2d at 465. 58 
 
   
presumptive only, and that in certain contexts, agencies have good reasons for embarking 
on a different course. The question is whether agencies have been able to suffer a 
reasonable defense of their decision to that effect. 
I have also attempted to set out some guidelines for the future, both under the 
cost-benefit default principles and under statutes that point in the same direction. It is 
necessary for agencies to particularize the idea of “significant” and “de minimis” risks 
through quantitative guidelines. A large point here is that the statistical probability of 
harm is not  all that matters; the size of the exposed population is important as well. 
“Feasibility” is not an off-on switch, and here too agencies should specify what they 
understand the term to mean, beginning with the admittedly vague notion that massive 
dislocations would be both necessary and sufficient to show that regulation is not 
feasible. We have seen that with respect to valuation of life and health, market measures 
can provide a good start, from which agencies are entitled to make reasonable 
adjustments. We have also seen that the most difficult issue involves selection of the 
appropriate discount rate. Reviewing courts should not require agencies to apply the same 
discount rate to life and health that they apply to money; with respect to discounting, 
there are good reasons to distinguish money from other goods. The most that courts can 
do is to impose ceilings and floors on agency judgments, by requiring a good rationale for 
whatever discount rate is chosen. 
The most general conclusion, signaled by the rise of the cost-benefit default 
principles, is that the nation is nearing t he end of a “first generation” debate about 
whether to adopt a presumption in favor of cost-benefit balancing, and rapidly moving 
into a “second generation” debate about when the presumption is rebutted, and about 
what cost-benefit analysis specifically entails. If cost-benefit analysis is to be defended, it 
is not because of especially controversial judgments of value, but because of a belief that 
regulatory action should be judged largely in terms of its consequences.
242 Suitably 
specified and understood, t he cost-benefit default principles should be regarded, not as a 
technique for stalling desirable regulation, but as a pragmatic effort to ensure that  59 
 
   
regulation responds to serious problems rather than to trivial or imaginary ones. And if 
they are seen i n these terms, the cost-benefit default principles operate not only a 
foundation for deterring regulation that promises to do less good than harm, but also as a 
basis for producing regulatory action where an assessment of the consequences shows 
that regulation is desirable.
243  
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